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of high quality research’ at the top of the ‘evidence hierarchy’ (Fulford, 2004, p. 215).<br />

Additionally, the Cartesian notion of the body as a machine has remained central to<br />

medical practice (Kennedy, 1981). Through this paradigm, the doctor approaches<br />

disease as a mechanic approaches an engine and illness is perceived as mechanical<br />

failure (1981, p. 20-21). This reductionist approach may also have influenced the<br />

primacy of value-free methods in health care contexts where scientific evidence is<br />

perceived to provide all the solutions.<br />

Similarly, the idealised model of legal decision making is the technical, objective and<br />

scientific approach, thought to lend neutrality and legitimacy to legal process (Kairys,<br />

1992, p. 13). To achieve this end, legal mechanisms (such as the elaborate and<br />

mystifying rules governing precedent) have developed which aim to eliminate or<br />

objectify values. In the positivist environment, the judge is portrayed as a neutral<br />

instrument of the law and “impartiality and the appearance of it are the supreme<br />

judicial virtues” (Devlin, 1979, p. 4; emphasis added). What has resulted is what Kairys<br />

has described as ‘the myth of legal reasoning’ (1992, p. 12-13).<br />

The problem is not that the courts deviate from legal reasoning. There<br />

is no legal reasoning in the sense of a legal methodology for reaching<br />

particular, correct results. There is a distinctly legal and quite elaborate<br />

system of discourse and body of knowledge, replete with its own<br />

language and conventions of argumentation, logic and even manners. In<br />

some ways these aspect of the law are so distinct and all-embracing as<br />

to amount to a separate culture, and for many lawyers the courthouse,<br />

the law firm, the language, the style, become a way of life.<br />

But in terms of a method or process for decision making – for<br />

determining correct rules, facts or results – the law provides only a wide<br />

and conflicting variety of stylised rationalisation from which courts pick<br />

and choose. Social and political judgements about the substance, parties<br />

and context of a case guide such choices, even when they are not the<br />

explicit or conscious basis of decisions.<br />

Fact and reasoning methods alone can never be sufficient to guide our decisions,<br />

particularly in ethically challenging questions about, for example, withdrawing life<br />

sustaining treatment from adults in a persistent vegetative state, or sterilising women<br />

with learning disabilities. From a moment’s self-reflection we know that values have an<br />

integral and necessary role in the decisions we make in our every day lives. There also<br />

exists a considerable body of research demonstrating that individual values are<br />

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