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Kant’s philosophy is uncompromising, proposing that the moral law specifies simply
what must be done, not what must be done to achieve an objective (Dickerson, 2004, p.
66). Kant was concerned with moral duty, not with the consequences of actions, and
gave the example of lying to demonstrate his theory (2002, p. 68). “I ought not to lie if I
want to maintain my reputation”. This formulation is what Kant calls a hypothetical
imperative. The action is guided not by the establishment of a moral duty not to lie.
Instead, the motivation for action lay in the consequence of action rather than in the
duty to follow the moral law per se. Kant argued against a hypothetical imperative in
which the motivation for action lay in its consequence. He argued instead for the
categorical imperative. According to the categorical imperative, the moral agent should
not be concerned with lying in order to achieve an objective. They should simply be
concerned with the maxim; “I ought not to lie”.
Autonomy and freedom of will are central to Kant’s moral philosophy (2002, p. 67 and
p. 74). Kant argued that normal adults are capable of being self-governing in moral
matters, and that through reason, we impose moral laws on ourselves which give rise to
obligations and the necessity to act in certain ways (Schneewind, 1992, p. 310). Kant
thought that an action done for the sake of duty, which is caused by a good will, cannot
be done out of desire or natural inclination (Thomson, 2003, p. 64). The duty is
prescribed by reason.
It is evident from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that Kant viewed pure
reason as solely deductive, excluding all sensory and empirical knowledge to establish
a right action.
Every one must admit that a law has to carry with it absolute necessity
if it is to be valid morally – valid, that is, as a ground of obligation; that
the command ‘Thou shalt not lie’ could not hold merely for men, other
rational beings having no obligation to abide by it – and similarly with
all other genuine moral laws; that here consequently the ground of
obligation must be looked for, not in the nature of man nor in the
circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but solely a priori in
the concepts of pure reason.
Kant, 2002, p. 21
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