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Chapter 4 - Values and best interest determinations<br />
We are in the midst of a revolution. It is a revolution about decision making and an<br />
increasingly influential world view which rejects the objectivist myth in law and<br />
medicine. The best interest test is both a symptom and a gauge of the conflict between a<br />
new paradigm, which calls for values transparency, and an old paradigm, which<br />
continues to rely on traditional value-free methods.<br />
There is a fundamental philosophical incompatibility between each approach. This has<br />
led to a paradox. We are no longer content to accept medical decision making which<br />
fails to capture the complexity and intrinsic subjectivity of decisions about, for<br />
example, withdrawing life sustaining treatment from insensate patients and sterilising<br />
women with intellectual disability. But we also seek certainty. So we have turned to the<br />
law to find the answers.<br />
However, both law and medicine are entrenched in objectivist approaches which simply<br />
have no mechanisms to account for values. The combined methods of medical science<br />
and positivist legal process can no longer be convincingly portrayed as the sole bases<br />
for justifying fundamental ethical questions. The indeterminacy of the best interest test<br />
implicitly acknowledges that the decisions are enormously complex and cannot be<br />
made by reference to an objective guideline or check list. This lack of specificity is<br />
also forcing the values which guide and drive decisions into the open. From case law it<br />
appears that decision makers are grappling with what are inescapably value judgements<br />
in frameworks which are not equipped for the new paradigm.<br />
I begin this chapter by returning to Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution. I propose that<br />
we are currently in a micro state of nature between two conflicting paradigms<br />
concerning medical decision making. I suggest that this period of conflict has placed us<br />
in a position of uncertainty about how best to make decisions on behalf of incapacitated<br />
adults. I draw on the existential framework developed in chapter three to explain our<br />
response to this uncertainty.<br />
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