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of my family over the lives of the rats. I prefer to have my house rat-free than to
compromise the safety of loved ones.
The argument that defining a value as a preference is too simplistic does not hold up to
scrutiny. Ultimately, however strongly held the value, and how seemingly significant
and highly regarded it is, it is still an expression of preference. I value world peace; I
prefer that all people in the world lived in harmony and without war. Conversely, what
may appear as a matter of simple preference may be an expression of significant and
deeply held values. I am going to buy the apple instead of the pear. I prefer the taste of
the apple, but I also know that the apple has been grown organically in my home town.
I prefer to buy the apple because I value locally grown organic produce and the support
this gives to the local economy.
Perry (1954) was also concerned with finding an all encompassing definition of value.
Perry recognised and emphasised that the realm of values and valuing constituted
“what may properly be given the name of ‘civilization’, that total human adventure
whose rising and declining fortunes give significance to human life upon this planet”
(p. 14). He argued for an understanding of values primarily in terms of interest. “A
thing - anything - has value or is valuable, in the original and generic sense, when it is
the object of interest - any interest. Of whatever is object of interest is ipso facto
valuable.” (Perry, 1954). Given the many different potential applications and meanings
of the word ‘interest’, however, this definition may increase confusion rather than
clarify. For example, interest may refer to your leisure pursuits, your bank balance,
your level of curiosity, what you think is advantageous to you or others. Perry’s use of
the word ‘interest’ conveys much the same meaning as when other theorists have used
the word ‘preference’. Perry used the word ‘interest’ to point to attitudes or having the
characteristic of “being for or against something.” (p. 6-7), and categorised acts such as
“liking – disliking” and “desiring – avoiding” as interests. These acts are essentially
expressions of preference.
A considerable advantage of defining values as expressions of preference is that it
transcends all potential applications of values and value theory. For a theory to be
accepted and endure it must be commonly understandable and applicable. Values and
value theory has expressly informed a variety of fields such as aesthetics, ethics,
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