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hysterectomy for a 29 year old woman with severe learning disabilities as a permanent<br />
solution for both menstrual management and contraception. In Re S [2001] there was<br />
conflicting medical opinion about the best solution. One of the doctors was proposing a<br />
partial hysterectomy and the other rejected surgery in favour of a mirena coil; a<br />
contraceptive device which also has the benefit of reducing menstrual flow. The<br />
surgeon who favoured the coil said of the proposed hysterectomy; “This is a normal<br />
woman and we would not dream of doing it [hysterectomy] for a woman just because<br />
of socially unacceptable periods” (p. 8).<br />
Best interests + Bolam = bad faith?<br />
I have examined case law which suggests that in response to difficult value judgements<br />
about permanently removing the reproductive capacity of women with learning<br />
difficulties, judges working within positivist frameworks have largely deferred to<br />
medical discretion. This provides a veneer of certainty and objectivity. Beneath this<br />
veneer of objective legal process and medical facts, the value judgements of decision<br />
makers remain implicit. They are value judgements about, for instance, the ability of<br />
intellectually disabled people to parent, about the use of education methods to teach and<br />
support intellectually disabled people to lead safer sexual lives and about the value of a<br />
woman’s physical integrity in relation to the convenience of carers. Without revealing<br />
the values which drive these decisions, they cannot be scrutinised or discussed, openly.<br />
Keywood (1998) suggests that the English courts may have been more concerned with<br />
ensuring that medical practitioners are not making negligent decisions in relation to<br />
their patients (p. 164). It is certainly puzzling that two of society’s influential<br />
institutions which we turn to for certainty and guidance about fundamental ethical and<br />
social issues respond with solutions which seem counter to a common sense view of<br />
what is in the person’s best interest. For instance, why have decision makers not simply<br />
requested that local authorities provide more help and support for vulnerable people?<br />
Why not explore alternative approaches for carers who cannot cope with the<br />
behavioural problems or the heavy periods that a woman with intellectual disability<br />
suffers at times of menstruation? The combination of legal and medical value-free<br />
decision making approaches circumvents these issues and promotes methods of<br />
objectification which detach the necessary, subjective judgements of decision makers<br />
167