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that the behaviour has detrimental consequences for all of us, or that it
will ultimately be bad for its perpetrators, or that it is inconsistent with
other behaviours and desires favoured by the perpetrators (like being
kind to their own family or tribe, for example). We can also explain
alternatives, but still we cannot prove that these alternatives are right
per se.
Few people would disagree with the assertion that paedophilia is wrong. However, it is
not possible to prove objectively, in the same way, for example, that we can prove that
water boils at 100 O C. How then do we know that paedophilia is wrong?
We feel that paedophilia is wrong. The contemplation of the action induces emotional
responses, for example, revulsion, anger and disgust for the perpetrator, and
compassion and sadness for the victim. We may also experience a physiological
response: feelings of nausea, or a ‘gut feeling’, sweaty palms, or a shiver down the
spine. The society and cultures that we have grown up with tell us paedophilia is
wrong; our religious teachings, our schools, families and peers. We may know of
someone who has been a victim, or who has worked professionally with perpetrators or
victims who tell of the awful effects. Policy and professional practice guidelines and
the laws in our society proclaim paedophilia as wrong. Our experience also tells us that
children are vulnerable and innocent members of society and social convention
endorses sex only between consenting adults. Our feelings, our cultures, our
upbringings, our lived experiences all culminate to tell us that paedophilia is wrong. It
is in this way that our values work instrumentally to guide our ethical judgement.
Ethical objectivism
As values have such an integral and essential role in ethical decision making, how does
the belief persist that there are moral absolutes and that ethical judgements can be made
without values? Ethical objectivism proposes that there can be objective moral truths
that can be established through pure reason or which exist externally and independently
of human assessment (Berggren, 1998).
James Rachels is a contemporary American philosopher who agrees with the objectivist
view of ethical decision making. Rachels (2003, p. 43) argues that we can support our
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