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I contend that because we seek certainty, we have called on the courts to adjudicate the<br />
decisions. However, legal decision makers (like others) cannot establish a definitive<br />
answer to the fundamental human questions raised. Judges working within positivist<br />
frameworks also seek certainty, which they have found largely by deferring back to<br />
medical solutions. I use best interest case law to support and develop my arguments. I<br />
conclude by suggesting that the only way to break the philosophical impasse is by<br />
recognising, accepting and revealing the values which inform and guide best interest<br />
determinations.<br />
The process of revolution<br />
In chapter two I drew parallels with Kuhn’s process of scientific revolution to<br />
demonstrate how values become objectified in law. To briefly re-cap, when a new<br />
paradigm is created in science, it must be valued by sufficient numbers of the relevant<br />
community for it to be successful. Because the new paradigm is incompatible with the<br />
old paradigm, there is a period of conflict. In the period of conflict, there is debate,<br />
during which the opportunity arises for the expression of values about the competing<br />
paradigms. The relevant communities make their choices and the new world view<br />
succeeds if there is sufficient support. The revolution is complete once the new<br />
paradigm is completely normalised within the scientific community. This process may<br />
take many years and even across generations.<br />
The new paradigm<br />
A new paradigm is emerging in medical decision making. Traditionally, health care<br />
treatment decisions for incapacitated adults were left to the discretion of health<br />
professionals. Social conventions promoting a paternalistic “doctor knows best”<br />
approach flourished in an environment in which medical professionals were accorded<br />
God-like status (Brazier, 1992). Under these conditions, treatment decisions were the<br />
domain of doctors, with an assumption that the ethical principle of beneficence<br />
underpinned their intentions (Eastman & Peay, 1999, p. 28). Medicine was seen by<br />
some as a new religion, doctors were seen as magicians and there was increasing<br />
medicalisation of the events of our everyday lives (Kennedy, 1981). In this<br />
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