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the judge conclude that the application is likely to advance the best interests of the<br />

claimant (Re A [2000], Thorpe LJ, p. 13). This interpretation raises questions about<br />

what is meant by the good of the individual, demanding a weighing of the benefits<br />

arising from possible courses of action (Bailey, 2001). Which evidence is placed on the<br />

gains side of the balance sheet and which to losses is a value judgement and entirely<br />

dependent on the preferences of the decision maker.<br />

Another alternative which has been mooted is the reasonable person standard. This<br />

involves selecting the course of action according to what most reasonable persons<br />

would choose (Docker, 2001) or what patients under similar conditions but competent<br />

have tended to choose (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1988). Reasonable patient approaches<br />

are akin to the substituted judgment test which has been favoured over the best interest<br />

test in some cases in the United States (Re Lucille Boyd [1979] (U.S) cited Kennedy &<br />

Grubb, 2000, p. 835). This approach is no less problematic. As Lord Mustill observed<br />

in Bland:<br />

To postulate a patient who is in such condition that he cannot know that<br />

there is a choice to be made, or indeed know anything at all, and then<br />

ask whether he would have chosen to terminate his life because that<br />

condition made it no longer worth living is surely meaningless…. The<br />

idea is simply fiction.<br />

The best interest test has been described as a welfare appraisal and this interpretation<br />

has been used more recently in two sterilisation cases in the U.K. (Re A [2000], Re S<br />

[2001]). The welfare appraisal finds its origins in family law and focuses on the<br />

patient’s contemporaneous needs, operating with the singular focus of the present<br />

welfare of the patient (Griffith, cited Myers, 1994). However, the welfare appraisal is<br />

also ill defined, and goes no further than acknowledging that a best interests<br />

determination should not comprise solely of considering the medical best interests of<br />

the adult concerned.<br />

The existing critique of the best interest test reflects decision makers grappling to make<br />

complex, value judgements within frameworks which do not acknowledge the<br />

necessary and integral role of values. Attempts to achieve a particular formula for<br />

making ethically complex best interest determinations using value-free decision making<br />

13

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