[Sample B: Approval/Signature Sheet] - George Mason University
[Sample B: Approval/Signature Sheet] - George Mason University
[Sample B: Approval/Signature Sheet] - George Mason University
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―If z is held fixed through at z 0 , what is your certainty equivalent for a 50-50<br />
gamble yielding values y1 and y2, say? Let us suppose the answer is y^.‖ 68<br />
Next, the following question is asked:<br />
―If z were held fixed at some other fixed value, say z’, would your certainty<br />
equivalent shift?‖ 69<br />
If the answer is no, then utility independence holds. The inverse procedure must<br />
also be done in order to check if Z is UI from Y. If they are, the utility function for Z can<br />
be defined without worrying about dependence on y.<br />
All cases are possible: neither holds, one holds without the other, nor both hold.<br />
When both attributes are UI, they are Mutually Utility Independent (MUI).<br />
―Definition: Attributes Y and Z are additive independent (AI) if the paired<br />
comparison of any two lotteries, defined by two joint probability distributions on Y x Z,<br />
depends only on their marginal probability distributions.‖ 70<br />
An equivalent condition for Y and Z to be additive independent can be represented<br />
by the lotteries in figure 8, which must be indifferent to the DM, for all (y, z) given an<br />
arbitrarily chosen y’ and z’.<br />
0.5 (y, z)<br />
0.5<br />
L1 ≡ and L2 ≡<br />
0.5 (y’, z’)<br />
0.5<br />
Figure 8. Additive Independence Assessment. 71<br />
68 Ibid.<br />
69 Ibid.<br />
70 Keeney and Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives, 230.<br />
31<br />
(y, z’)<br />
(y’, z)