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Download - Foreign Military Studies Office - U.S. Army

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damning comment could prove to be from an International Herald Tribune<br />

article on 1 October. Written by Frederick Bonnart, the editorial director of the<br />

independent but highly authoritative NATO’s Nations, the article discusses how<br />

NATO “propaganda” was used against the West. He notes:<br />

In democracies, it is the duty of the public services to present<br />

the truth even in wartime, and particularly when they are in<br />

sole control of the information. If it is deliberately designed to<br />

engender fear and hate, then the correct term is propaganda. 252<br />

In particular, Bonnart believes the armored vehicle totals did not properly<br />

represent the vehicles actually destroyed, and that NATO deliberately used the<br />

West’s reputation for truth and fairness to carry out a highly charged<br />

information policy against the Serbs. This made NATO’s information policy<br />

rife with propaganda, Bonnart contends, and he points out that<br />

recommendations are being prepared to create a future NATO crisis<br />

information organization to keep this from happening again. 253 When did we<br />

ever think that a NATO-oriented publication’s editor would be publicly<br />

accusing SACEUR’s organization of propaganda and disinformation?<br />

Assessing the Results of Information Superiority<br />

One danger of the air campaign over Yugoslavia is overestimating<br />

NATO and US capabilities. All of the systems did not function all of the time<br />

with perfection. For example, some of the high-tech systems were unable to<br />

operate under poor weather conditions, as underscored in the daily Pentagon<br />

briefings during the campaign. Certainly it was an exaggeration to say:<br />

A vast number of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance<br />

systems allowed for the rapid collection and collating into a<br />

single system the vital battlefield intelligence that we sent to<br />

our shooters. Taken together, all these innovations allowed our<br />

pilots to hit any target, any time, day or night, in any weather,<br />

accurate to within a few feet. 254<br />

Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in a November speech in<br />

California, listed several extremely important qualifiers regarding capabilities.<br />

252 Frederick Bonnart, “NATO Has a Duty to Be Truthful,” International Herald<br />

Tribune, 1 October 1999.<br />

253 Ibid.<br />

254 William S. Cohen, International Institute for Strategic <strong>Studies</strong>, Hotel del Coronado,<br />

Coronado, California, 9 September 1999, downloaded from the Internet (OSD/PA news<br />

release), http://www.defenselink.mil:80/news/Sep1999/b09101999_bt409-99.html.<br />

143

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