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attack against Arab and Muslim rights.” The website also showed footage of
Hezbollah officials attacking the US with their fiery speeches. 494
Such postings and events are now commonplace. They demonstrate
that there is no sole point of reference to understand a conflict. In 1991, during
Operation Desert Storm, CNN fulfilled that task. Now there are a multitude of
websites that offer a summary of events from almost any point of view. All one
has to do is search the web to find what one is looking for in the way of images,
directives, viewpoints, or testimonials.
A fifth conclusion is that counterpropaganda is neither a core nor a
supporting capability of current US IO doctrine. This issue is listed separately
from other IO concerns because it is so important. With no counterpropaganda
capability to contend with, insurgents have found the cyber or propaganda
battlefield much easier to manipulate.
After the initial coalition campaign ended in Iraq in April 2003, US
forces were as likely to conduct police operations as combat (patrolling,
reconnaissance, raids, etc.) operations in the stalemate environment that ensued.
It has done so now for over two years, and at the same time the insurgents’
cyber activities have grown more effective. The US appears to need a
counterpropaganda capability to maintain the IO high ground that can be too
easily conceded to the insurgents.
The term counterpropaganda does not appear in the new JP 3-13 slated
for release in 2005. Is it the word “propaganda” that is offensive? If so then a
new term is needed. Perhaps counterinfluence is a good candidate for inclusion
as a supporting activity. Without such a capability we have given the insurgents
an entire media field in which to play. Norvell De Atkine, a former US Army
colonel and well-known PSYOP specialist for Middle East affairs, reported
from Iraq that “there can be no higher priority than coming on line and on the
air with a massive information blitz to get the full story in the game.” 495 He also
added that in the media war the US has “been a massive and inexplicable
failure.” 496
Some would disagree with this assessment, especially those focusing
on the strategic level. And they have an argument. The White House has a
494 “FBIS Analysis: Lebanon—Al Manar Highlights Hezbollah, Iranian, Iraqi Anti-US
and France Rhetoric,” 22 December 2004 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS
website on 22 December 2004.
495 Norvell B. De Atkine, “It’s an Information War,” Proceedings, January 2004, p. 65.
496 Ibid.
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