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War. 507 Thus the situational setting has serious implications for the trinity
whose shape is now somewhat altered by context.
While not specifically highlighted earlier but scattered throughout this
book is the seventh conclusion, the notion that some changes are required in
specific aspects of who implements IO and how its integration should be
viewed (as the key element of an IO plan in an IO cell or as integrated
technological information that is obtained, processed and transposed into a fire
mission of lethal destruction). For example, as mentioned above, on more than
one occasion artillery officers have been put in charge of IO affairs at division
or higher level. Why? There are usually two answers: first, because they have
few actual missions to run in a stability operations environment; and second,
because they understand “targeting.”
It is hard to comprehend this logic. It is easy to understand the
necessity of keeping troops busy. But targeting of a location with artillery
rounds (the need to achieve destruction) does NOT qualify someone to
understand how to integrate and employ the five core capabilities of IO, nor
does it allow for these capabilities to be integrated within a cultural
understanding of the situation at hand. Just because artillery officers understand
“targeting” does not mean they understand postconflict IO in the human
dimension. US personnel must understand the population they are trying to
influence and that demands an in-depth understanding of languages, cultures,
values, signs, and symbols from the target’s perspective. With all of its cultural
and ideological implications, local IO is simply too complex for untrained
personnel. Can an average artilleryman sip tea in a local café and speak the
dialect to understand how and why people listen to the news? Perhaps even
more important, why does the US military have an IO Corps if they are not
used as the lead IO element for which they train and educate their people? Do
we need slots for generals in the IO field to enable the command to have clout
and be taken seriously?
Foreign area officers (FAOs) and civilian area specialists should
supplement IO specialists and help them plan IO operations. These officers are
trained in language and cultural affairs, serve in embassies, and understand the
regional specifics of the country in question. To leave them out of the IO
process is a terrible oversight. If they are not to be included here, then why have
a FAO branch at all? The FAO or IO specialist can explain to the commander
507 For more on this issue, see Jacob W. Kipp, “Lenin and Clausewitz: The
Militarization of Marxism, 1915-1921,” Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to
Gorbachev, 1915-1991, edited by Willard C. Frank, Jr., and Philip S. Gillette,
Greenwood Press, 1992.
279