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The Chechens were easily able to provoke, intimidate, persuade, and deceive
Russian soldiers on many occasions.
Not surprisingly, the first Russian-Chechen conflict caused several
moral-psychological problems for the Russian armed forces. The main problem
was the impact of the mass media on a soldier, and the lack of material support
during the initial winter months of the operation (when a quick victory was
sought). The focus for moral-psychological support to the troops, according to
Zolotarev, should be educating service members on their patriotic duty,
formation of hatred for the enemy, the development of both moral character and
fighting qualities in the soldier, the timely detection of psychological injuries in
their subordinates, and ideological and moral-psychological protection from
enemy propaganda. This was not accomplished in the fight for Chechnya. It
was also noted that informing personnel about the situation, together with
propaganda to improve the fighter in battle (dissemination of combat
experiences, etc.) and preventing the dissemination of facts that damaged civilmilitary
relations, was not conducted.
In the second conflict, from October 1999 to the present, the Russian
armed forces did much better in preparing the moral-psychological condition of
soldiers. The Main Directorate for Educational Work and corresponding
structures in the North Caucasus Military District published a newsletter on a
periodic basis. It was clear that the command wanted to prevent Chechens from
developing an information and psychological influence on soldiers, especially
through Russian and foreign mass media outlets, as happened the first time. 348
The military publication Morskoi Sbornik [Navy Journal] published a
long article on the moral-psychological conditioning of soldiers in Chechnya,
and Voennaya Mysl [Military Thought] did the same. The latter article
highlighted the activities of a naval infantry battalion fighting in Chechnya. 349
The article noted both group and individual tasks. For the former,
“indoctrination” personnel offered a rundown on the propaganda machine of
the Chechens and how their psychological operations impacted on the
consciousness and psyche of servicemen. Instruction was provided on how to
act during contacts with the population, and how to use weapons in areas where
combatants were present (training which didn’t seem to do much good in light
of the need to issue a special order to stop “cleansing” operations amongst
348 Aleksandr Dyankonov, “From the Experience of Hot Spots. Honoring the Naval
Infantrymen,” Armeyskiy Sbornik [Army Journal], 1 June 2001, pp. 32-35.
349 D’yakonov, A. G., “The Moral-Psychological Support Experience of the Counter-
Terrorist Operation,” Voennaya Mysl [Military Thought], No. 3 (May-June) 2001, pp.
41-48.
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