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offsets and technological counters? How reliable will those new estimates be?
What will happen when a real information warfare system confronts ours? Will
our capabilities be degraded by a quarter, a third, or more?
The Pentagon’s top civilian leaders evidently plan to produce an
official report on Kosovo, breaking their study into three parts: a deploymentemployment
group, an intelligence support for operations group, and an
alliance and coalition warfare group. It is important that the intelligence support
group study the current information superiority dogma to correct some of the
faulty data and impressions being generated by both analysts and leaders from
the Kosovo conflict. We have to stop ourselves before heading down the wrong
“yellow brick road,” and instead inculcate the wisdom that people like Admiral
Ellis are revealing. NATO and the United States did almost everything right in
Kosovo. Now it is time to assess the little that was done wrong. As the Chinese
might say, you can lose in contemporary war in two ways: if you fail to defend
your information superiority, or if you become trapped by false information. It
is the latter to which we should now pay attention.
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