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One answer to the problem of anomalies has been offered by Peircean
Semeiotics, the science of self-controlled, deliberate reasoning while focused
on problem solving. It is a body of thought that offers the opportunity to
construct a system that is able to deal with and react to a new situation in a nonprogrammed
manner. All artificial intelligence systems developed to date do
not fit these criteria. 378 Complexity theory is another approach to solving the
problem that could be investigated.
These features of software demonstrate the growing complexity of
working in virtual space. More importantly, this puts a new spin on the old
saying “if there is the perception of a problem, then we have a problem...even if
the problem is simply the perception.” What if the perception problem is in the
software? Will cultural software research become a new branch of investigation
as a result? And will the new “enemy-image” manifested as software-generated
blips and pixels so dehumanize adversaries into images that the use of force
will be more likely instead of less likely?
Problem Three: The Human Dimension
The context within which decisions are made is complicated today by
an increasing reliance on a virtual image of reality (or simulacrum, an image or
representation of reality). Often the analyst/decision-maker’s frame of
reference, expectations, and training leaves them unprepared for what is
represented in virtual space and for its interpretation. From nation to nation an
analyst= s vision of virtual space varies, dependent not only on the software and
analytical tools available but also on the cultural and religious philosophies
shaping the analyst’s/programmer’s view of reality. Unaccustomed to studying
a virtual “enemy-image,” analysts struggle to interpret the virtual images they
see or hear within their own context.
The interpretation of the intent of an electronic image or the detection
of electronic waves depends on the picture of virtual reality for which the
country-specific analyst was trained. This implies that the decision-making
focus has shifted some from planner/analyst/decision-maker and is now heavily
influenced by the operator. Analysis now is more in the direction of
operator/analyst/decision-maker. Greater reliance on the operator= s
interpretation implies that it is the tactical operator or the analyst who will have
to make many of the incredibly vital and critical decisions about target
engagements, not strategic leaders.
378 Discussion with Mr. Ed Nozawa of Lockheed on 11 February 1999.
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