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Download - Foreign Military Studies Office - U.S. Army

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that produced a daily intelligence document reporting on street rumors in<br />

Baghdad. His insights on the cultural foundation of Iraqi society and their<br />

relation to IO are of acute interest and importance.<br />

Putnam believes animosity still runs high among Iraqis because the US<br />

is ineffective at disseminating its message to the Iraqi people. Most<br />

importantly, this is because the US military is determined “to make the Iraqi<br />

information environment conform to its information operations and public<br />

affairs doctrine on how things should be done, rather than vice versa.” 515 It is<br />

clearly one of the most important observations regarding how we are<br />

conducting the war for hearts and minds.<br />

Putnam believes there are two problems. The first problem is that the<br />

US is using Arab media outlets as its middlemen, and they often have their own<br />

agendas. Thus, the coalition message isn’t getting out. Second, he believes that<br />

the coalition has “failed to grasp how Iraqis receive their information and<br />

formulate their opinions.” 516 As a result Iraqis trust us less and are more<br />

susceptible to anti-coalition propaganda. It is this latter point that appears to be<br />

the most important because it strikes at the heart of cultural awareness.<br />

Putnam believes that the populace obtains information from satellite<br />

TV, family and friends, the streets, religious figures, and newspapers. Once this<br />

“circle of influence” disseminates information, family and friends discuss it.<br />

They in turn process the information. Attitudes are developed from these<br />

discussions. These discussions are then shared with others, and the information<br />

spreads on the street.<br />

A question put to Putnam was why the US didn’t have a local TV<br />

network put out an unprejudiced viewpoint on what was occurring. When<br />

presented this question, a local TV network representative told Putnam that the<br />

network could not appear too neutral because it would lose viewers to al<br />

Jazeera’s “stranglehold on the Arab populace.” 517 The insurgents understand the<br />

“circle of influence” according to Putnam and know how to shape the opinions<br />

of the Iraqi people. They place rumors in a trusted medium where Iraqis will<br />

accept them as true. Insurgents also dominate the information environment by<br />

spreading fear amongst the populace. People are afraid to say anything positive<br />

about the coalition, and thus the anti-coalition rumors become uncontested<br />

515 Bill Putnam, “Winning Iraqi Hearts and Minds,” <strong>Army</strong>, January 2005, p. 7.<br />

516 Ibid.<br />

517 Ibid.<br />

284

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