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Download - Foreign Military Studies Office - U.S. Army

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He must be able to analyze and not just collect, process, and disseminate<br />

information. If the latter is all that the analyst can achieve then we may have to<br />

witness another Kosovo-type campaign (which demonstrated that information<br />

war was just a myth).<br />

Is There a Need for a <strong>Military</strong> Software Science?<br />

The foregoing discussion has described the concept of electronic intent,<br />

the problems associated with so much reliance on software programming, and<br />

the role of the human dimension in the problem. It appears prudent in the face<br />

of such developments to examine the potential for a new branch of theory<br />

called military software science. This scientific activity would serve as a<br />

clearing house to analyze various types of military software logic. <strong>Military</strong><br />

software science would require very specialized analysts from the software<br />

engineering, culture, and military history and art domains. They would form a<br />

military software science directorate within the Department of Defense to<br />

handle the problem. Its importance cannot be overstated. Software is now the<br />

integrator and coordinator for the allocation and synchronization of forces. It<br />

enhances command and control logic and supervision. While the overseer of the<br />

battlefield analysis process remains the commander who applies the principles<br />

of war and military stratagem, it must not be forgotten that the commander<br />

receives his information from the operator, whose perception and analysis<br />

could be virtually manipulated. Thus the operator could provide commanders<br />

with inaccurate data upon which to make their decisions.<br />

Conclusions<br />

The discussion has attempted to outline emerging threats in the hot spot<br />

known as the ether or infosphere. It focused on some of the factors that a<br />

digitized force will encounter. It is tentative thinking and invites much further<br />

exploration.<br />

The argument has been presented that nations have seldom considered<br />

the cultural aspects that may drive another nation= s computer software<br />

programming mechanism. Neither do they have any idea how to measure<br />

electronic intent, nor a way to trust computer output that, because of its<br />

processing speed, detects threats and offers options quicker than humans can<br />

comprehend. The development of a military software science directorate may<br />

help with some or all of these issues.<br />

With regard to software, many countries have already had a cultural<br />

invasion of sorts. Programmers in various countries wrote many of the first<br />

programs, and perhaps introduced a cultural bias for the way future programs<br />

are written that has become invisible to follow-on generations. Militaries<br />

210

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