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combat capabilities of ground troops by one and a half times, and decreases the
loss of aviation by four to six times, and of ships by two to three times. 313
A year later Volodin noted that EW was growing from a support to a
new, independent, specific form of military operation. This indicates that the
communications struggle in the war in Chechnya had demonstrated to the
Russian military the increased importance of the service. Volodin noted that the
struggle for superiority of control mechanisms includes not only electronic
suppression of an enemy’s communications means but also their electronic
destruction. Further, he noted that success in combat depends on the “stability
of the state and military command and control system and other information
systems against the information-psychological, software and electronic
influence of an enemy.” In Chechnya, Volodin pointed to Russian successes in
helicopter and portable electronic reconnaissance and suppression systems,
specialized automated jamming systems, and automated equipment systems
which permitted operational-tactical computations with the use of modern
information technologies, including electronic terrain maps. 314
These maps made a significant difference by providing Russian forces
with an accurate display of the land before them. During the first Chechen
campaign, maps in the troops’ hands were made years before in Soviet days.
Commanders were extremely critical of the 1980 maps they received before the
first Grozny battle, which resulted in many leaders getting lost. Entire
“microrayons” were absent from some maps. Those used by the troops in 1999,
according to General G. Troshev, commander of Russian troops during the
second Chechen campaign, were not any better at the start of the operation.
As a result, the Topographic Service rushed into publication both paper
and electronic maps. To the Russians, the system of topogeodetic support is
now an element of the side’s information conflict or confrontation. Now
…electronic maps were being used successfully for accomplishing
tactical missions, assessing terrain properties, determining the
disposition of friendly battle formations, determining target
coordinates, selecting assault landing sectors and so on. This required
not only electronic topographic maps, but also electronic photomaps
313 Oleg Falchev interview with Valeriy Volodin, “The Battlefield—The Airwaves,”
Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 15 April 2000, as translated and downloaded from the
FBIS website on 18 April 2000.
314 Oleg Falichev interview with Valeriy Volodin, “Electronic Warfare Chief on State,
Prospects of EW Service,” Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 14 April 2001 as translated
and downloaded from the FBIS website on 13 April 2001.
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