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A sixth conclusion is that the subjective nature of war, its
characteristics, is changing and evolving. Carl von Clausewitz noted in On War
that “very few of the new manifestations in war can be ascribed to new
inventions or new departures in ideas. They result mainly from the
transformation of society and new social conditions.” 504 The subjective nature
of war is about how every society has its own characteristic form of war. 505
Iraqi society fits that description of an evolving form of war today. Here small
unorganized units utilize the social fabric of organized society (networks,
miniaturized devices, etc) to conduct war. The objective nature of war, on the
other hand, is close to being a constant and involves two sides that are
organized and pitted against one another in a battle of violence and hatred.
Author Hans Magnus Enzenberger noted as long ago as 1994 that the
nature of war was changing from “purposive, ideologically driven enterprises
undertaken by highly organized industrial powers” to “molecular civil war.” 506
Insurgent tactics in Iraq appear to fit Enzenberger’s description. A social
transformation is underway that has enabled the insurgents’ tactics, especially
on the boundaries of societies where the most interesting permutations are
taking place. Unfortunately too few people are in touch with this transformation
and its significance for the armed forces, which is attempting to decipher what
is unfolding before it. Coalition forces have only a limited frame of reference
for understanding the world that plays out around them, where groups meet and
plan virtually without legal constraints. Analysts may find less utility in
studying Clausewitz in the near term and more use for comprehending the
operating principles of the Smart Mob.
Perhaps some aspects of Clausewitz’s theory need to be reexamined in
this modern context. Is war now a continuation of religion by other means? Is
Clausewitz’s second trinity (the people, commander, and government) only
applicable in a European and nation-state context? In the Middle East, there is a
religious force that Clausewitz did not encounter. The religious leader
sometimes represents or is the government, and religion becomes the
motivating impulse behind society and the armed forces. There is a precedent
for such reinterpretations. Lenin rewrote Clausewitz for the class and
ideological struggle, and the West had to adapt to that in its conduct of the Cold
504 Colin Gray, “Clausewitz, History, and the Future Strategic World,” The Strategic
and Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional, Number 47, Contemporary Essays, June
2003, accessed at http://www.army.mod.uk/img/doctrine/scsi47.pdf.
505 Ibid.
506 Hans Magnus Enzenberger, Civil Wars: From LA to Bosnia, New York: New Press,
1994.
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