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a real disadvantage since its radar stations, cellular and trunk-line
communications, and relay points were bombed in the first weeks of the war.
But other systems such as satellite telephones and field commanders’ radios
were available to the Chechen commanders, and this equipment appeared to be
sufficient. The low number of Russian units capable of conducting such warfare
also offset this disadvantage.
Colonel Vasiliy Gumeniy, Chief of the Russian North Caucasus
Military District= s radio-electronic warfare service, supported this view that, in
spite of all the disadvantages, the Chechens had developed an extensive
reconnaissance communications system by 1999. In April 2000, he and
coauthor Colonel Vladimir Matyash noted that the Chechens had acquired the
following reconnaissance communications equipment by the start of the war: a
network of NMT-450 standard cellular communications (connected to a cellular
communications system in Ingushetia, allowing field commanders to have 20-
60 “correspondents” 305 in their radio network, and 60-80 correspondents in the
reconnaissance information network of short-wave range); a trunk-line
communication system using Motorola and Kenwood products, among others;
radio relay communication lines; stationary and mobile tele-broadcast stations;
short-wave communications from international organizations like the Red
Cross; radio networks based on amateur short-wave radio transmission
resources; cable communication lines; and portable and mobile radio
communications equipment (operating in the ultra short-wave spectrum of 136-
74, 300-50, and 390-470 megahertz) and radio telephones operating in the 860-
960 megahertz range. Satellite communications in Chechnya were conducted
via INMARSAT and IRIDIUM systems, offering access to both intercity and
international communication nets and the Internet. 306 Further, they noted that
Chechen reconnaissance was conducted with optical-electronic, acoustic, radiotechnical,
and radar means. Chechen “front” commanders had mobile TV
transmitters that could transmit 20-30 kilometers. These broadcasts were
sometimes used to show Russian atrocities against Chechen civilians or to
engage in visual deception. Authors Gumenniy and Matyash concluded that the
Chechens had professionally prepared for information war with their
reconnaissance communications assets. 307
305 Correspondents were radio amateurs acting in the interest of the Chechens.
306 Vasiliy Gumenniy, Vladimir Matyash, “War in the Airwaves,” Krasnaya Zvezda
[Red Star], 5 April 2000, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 4
April 2000.
307 Ibid.
173