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Full Report - Subregional Office for East and North-East Asia - escap

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DEVELOPMENTAL MACROECONOMICS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE CHAPTER 3<br />

Capital flows: managing enhances<br />

policy space <strong>and</strong> mitigates financial<br />

sector fragility<br />

The opening of the capital account is seen as<br />

essential <strong>for</strong> encouraging capital flows <strong>and</strong> the<br />

development of the domestic capital market. These<br />

are expected to enhance both the volume <strong>and</strong><br />

efficiency of investment <strong>and</strong> hence, economic<br />

growth. However, empirical evidence of the growthenhancing<br />

effect of capital account liberalization<br />

(CAL) is mixed. In surveying the empirical literature,<br />

Cobham (2001, p. 5) concluded: “… that the (net)<br />

benefits of CAL <strong>for</strong> developing countries have not<br />

been established. Indeed … it is more accurate to<br />

say that these benefits may not necessarily exist<br />

<strong>for</strong> poorer countries”.<br />

There are a number of<br />

shortcomings of capital<br />

account opening<br />

Critics have pointed out a number of shortcomings<br />

of a generalized prescription <strong>for</strong> capital account<br />

opening <strong>for</strong> all countries regardless of their level of<br />

development. 27 First, the target of capital account<br />

convertibility is mainly short-term portfolio capital<br />

<strong>and</strong> not the long-term FDI that developing countries<br />

need the most. FDI is not known to depend greatly<br />

on capital account opening. On the other h<strong>and</strong>,<br />

capital account liberalization makes it easy <strong>for</strong> FDI<br />

to leave a country. In order to remain attractive,<br />

developing countries end up offering various tax<br />

concessions – often they race to the bottom. This<br />

means that the burden of raising (or maintaining)<br />

fiscal revenue shifts from capital income to labour<br />

income. As a result, the after-tax income distribution<br />

is likely to become more unequal, which reduces<br />

the growth elasticity of poverty reduction.<br />

Second, the prospect of capital flight <strong>for</strong>ces<br />

Governments to adopt a very conservative fiscal<br />

policy stance (Stiglitz, 2000). Given the limitation of<br />

raising revenues, in most cases, this means cuts<br />

in government expenditure, especially in the social<br />

<strong>and</strong> infrastructure sectors. Thus, the prospect of<br />

capital flight restricts a country’s ability to use fiscal<br />

<strong>and</strong> monetary policies to address such issues as<br />

investment in infrastructure, priority sector development<br />

<strong>and</strong> human development, which are more important<br />

to attract FDI than capital account convertibility.<br />

Third, countries at the lower level of development do<br />

not have an adequate institutional <strong>and</strong> legal framework<br />

to h<strong>and</strong>le capital flows nor are they attractive <strong>for</strong><br />

such flows. Instead, they face the problem of capital<br />

flight. Thus, capital account opening in most cases<br />

is found to increase capital outflows, not inflows. In<br />

order to prevent capital outflows, these countries are<br />

<strong>for</strong>ced to maintain high domestic interest rates, which<br />

adversely affect domestic investment, especially in<br />

SMEs. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, if the high domestic<br />

interest rate attracts capital inflows, it can adversely<br />

affect a country’s international competitiveness <strong>and</strong><br />

the pace of industrialization due to a Dutch diseaselike<br />

syndrome. This happens as a result of a real<br />

appreciation in the value of domestic currency.<br />

Under a flexible exchange rate system, dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />

domestic currency by <strong>for</strong>eign investors is likely to<br />

lead to nominal <strong>and</strong> hence real appreciation. Under<br />

a fixed exchange rate regime, the accumulation<br />

of <strong>for</strong>eign currency by the central bank will cause<br />

monetary expansion <strong>and</strong> hence, inflation. There<strong>for</strong>e,<br />

in either case, there will be real appreciation.<br />

This was exactly what happened in South-<strong>East</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n<br />

countries prior to the crisis. If the Government tries<br />

to sterilize the effect of capital flows on money<br />

supply by issuing bonds, it will further push up<br />

the interest rate, causing crowding out of private<br />

investment <strong>and</strong> fuelling more capital inflows.<br />

In the <strong>Asia</strong>n crisis even countries<br />

at a higher level of development<br />

found it difficult to h<strong>and</strong>le<br />

short-term capital flows<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, if the Government channels the<br />

inflows through commercial banks, the banks will<br />

have excess liquidity. This may tempt commercial<br />

banks into a more lax scrutiny of loan applications,<br />

which increases the fragility of the banking sector.<br />

155

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