Full Report - Subregional Office for East and North-East Asia - escap
Full Report - Subregional Office for East and North-East Asia - escap
Full Report - Subregional Office for East and North-East Asia - escap
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DEVELOPMENTAL MACROECONOMICS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE CHAPTER 3<br />
Capital flows: managing enhances<br />
policy space <strong>and</strong> mitigates financial<br />
sector fragility<br />
The opening of the capital account is seen as<br />
essential <strong>for</strong> encouraging capital flows <strong>and</strong> the<br />
development of the domestic capital market. These<br />
are expected to enhance both the volume <strong>and</strong><br />
efficiency of investment <strong>and</strong> hence, economic<br />
growth. However, empirical evidence of the growthenhancing<br />
effect of capital account liberalization<br />
(CAL) is mixed. In surveying the empirical literature,<br />
Cobham (2001, p. 5) concluded: “… that the (net)<br />
benefits of CAL <strong>for</strong> developing countries have not<br />
been established. Indeed … it is more accurate to<br />
say that these benefits may not necessarily exist<br />
<strong>for</strong> poorer countries”.<br />
There are a number of<br />
shortcomings of capital<br />
account opening<br />
Critics have pointed out a number of shortcomings<br />
of a generalized prescription <strong>for</strong> capital account<br />
opening <strong>for</strong> all countries regardless of their level of<br />
development. 27 First, the target of capital account<br />
convertibility is mainly short-term portfolio capital<br />
<strong>and</strong> not the long-term FDI that developing countries<br />
need the most. FDI is not known to depend greatly<br />
on capital account opening. On the other h<strong>and</strong>,<br />
capital account liberalization makes it easy <strong>for</strong> FDI<br />
to leave a country. In order to remain attractive,<br />
developing countries end up offering various tax<br />
concessions – often they race to the bottom. This<br />
means that the burden of raising (or maintaining)<br />
fiscal revenue shifts from capital income to labour<br />
income. As a result, the after-tax income distribution<br />
is likely to become more unequal, which reduces<br />
the growth elasticity of poverty reduction.<br />
Second, the prospect of capital flight <strong>for</strong>ces<br />
Governments to adopt a very conservative fiscal<br />
policy stance (Stiglitz, 2000). Given the limitation of<br />
raising revenues, in most cases, this means cuts<br />
in government expenditure, especially in the social<br />
<strong>and</strong> infrastructure sectors. Thus, the prospect of<br />
capital flight restricts a country’s ability to use fiscal<br />
<strong>and</strong> monetary policies to address such issues as<br />
investment in infrastructure, priority sector development<br />
<strong>and</strong> human development, which are more important<br />
to attract FDI than capital account convertibility.<br />
Third, countries at the lower level of development do<br />
not have an adequate institutional <strong>and</strong> legal framework<br />
to h<strong>and</strong>le capital flows nor are they attractive <strong>for</strong><br />
such flows. Instead, they face the problem of capital<br />
flight. Thus, capital account opening in most cases<br />
is found to increase capital outflows, not inflows. In<br />
order to prevent capital outflows, these countries are<br />
<strong>for</strong>ced to maintain high domestic interest rates, which<br />
adversely affect domestic investment, especially in<br />
SMEs. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, if the high domestic<br />
interest rate attracts capital inflows, it can adversely<br />
affect a country’s international competitiveness <strong>and</strong><br />
the pace of industrialization due to a Dutch diseaselike<br />
syndrome. This happens as a result of a real<br />
appreciation in the value of domestic currency.<br />
Under a flexible exchange rate system, dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
domestic currency by <strong>for</strong>eign investors is likely to<br />
lead to nominal <strong>and</strong> hence real appreciation. Under<br />
a fixed exchange rate regime, the accumulation<br />
of <strong>for</strong>eign currency by the central bank will cause<br />
monetary expansion <strong>and</strong> hence, inflation. There<strong>for</strong>e,<br />
in either case, there will be real appreciation.<br />
This was exactly what happened in South-<strong>East</strong> <strong>Asia</strong>n<br />
countries prior to the crisis. If the Government tries<br />
to sterilize the effect of capital flows on money<br />
supply by issuing bonds, it will further push up<br />
the interest rate, causing crowding out of private<br />
investment <strong>and</strong> fuelling more capital inflows.<br />
In the <strong>Asia</strong>n crisis even countries<br />
at a higher level of development<br />
found it difficult to h<strong>and</strong>le<br />
short-term capital flows<br />
On the other h<strong>and</strong>, if the Government channels the<br />
inflows through commercial banks, the banks will<br />
have excess liquidity. This may tempt commercial<br />
banks into a more lax scrutiny of loan applications,<br />
which increases the fragility of the banking sector.<br />
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