OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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PART – 3 Military Strategy ‣ Indo – Pak Conflicts; 1998 to Date ‣ Evolution of Operational Art (1910 to 1989) ‣ 4GW And Emerging Contours of 5GW: Political-Military Dimensions and Impact on World Politics OPINION Vol.1 No.1 104 June 2013
INDO – PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE “We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not so great to produce results in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest demands that we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan, and at the same time, add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not from the armed forces but the industrial and economic background behind them. As we grow in strength, as we are likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less inclined to threaten or harass us, and a time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept a settlement that we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere.” Introduction (Nehru 1 , August 1952) The continuum spanning almost fourteen years from 1998 to date appears to be a one long India – Pakistan crisis punctuated by periods of apparent peace yet marred by the intense struggle at sub conventional level, both within the kinetic and non-kinetic domains. The bilateral relationship between the two arch-rivals has been clouded by territorial disputes leading to a series of wars and crises. Kashmir, which remains to be the bone of contention since 1947, is not merely a living symbol of incomplete identities but a continuing reminder of an extraordinarily violent separation that cost as many as two million lives without a war being fought 2 . Since May 1998, with overt nuclearization, the traditional rivalry between India and Pakistan acquired a new dimension. With the war becoming increasingly unthinkable, the advent of nuclear weapons generated a twin proclivity for crisis and caution. The “stability – instability paradox”, produced a high degree of stability at the strategic level yet it bred instability at lower levels enabling both the countries to continue their confrontation short of war. In 1999, during Kargil Conflict, in spite of mutual provocations, neither side sought to mobilize for a full-scale war. Immediately after 9/11, Twin Peaks Crisis was triggered between India and Pakistan by a terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. In this ten months long crisis, both sides mobilized for war, but remained short of indulging in an armed engagement. Sequel to realization by both, of the futility of armed conflict between nuclear rivals and consequent devastation which it may cause, they began a comprehensive “Composite Dialogue” in 2004 on a wide range of political and strategic issues and agreed to reduce nuclear risks through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). However, the dialogue had hardly gained momentum that it was brought to a grinding halt by Mumbai terrorists’ attacks in November 2008 which marked the third conflict in a short span of nine years. Consequent to 9/11, India, having made inroads into Afghanistan under the patronage of USA, launched sub conventional/proxy war against Pakistan to foment and aggravate unrest in Balochistan 3 and support violence in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The radicalized Pakistani society, due to a host of reasons, is also being utilized as an ideal testing ground for the implementation of Kautilya – Chanakya’s insidious strategies to destabilize Pakistan while keeping it under the perpetual assault of non kinetic forces. Global War on Terror and continuing tensions between the two nuclear neighbours saw the United States plunging deeper into the region’s strategic politics and crises, yet in the overall assessment, it did succeed in defusing those crises which came in a succession. Currently, in the backdrop of resumption of Composite Dialogue in 2010, both the countries appear to be determined to normalize their relations so as to give peace a chance once again. Aim To analyze the Indo – Pak conflicts from 1998 to date with a view to drawing lessons from policy/strategic dimensions. Scope The paper, while focusing on Decision Making at strategic level, Impact/efficacy of nuclear deterrence, Sub conventional domain of the conflict, Role of US in de-escalation and Strategic coercion will encompass following:- Part 1. Kargil Conflict – 1999. Part 2. Mil Standoff – 2001/2002 (Twin Peaks Crisis). Part 3. Escalation – 2008 (Mumbai Terrorists Attack). Part 4. Lessons learnt from policy/strategic dimensions. OPINION Vol.1 No.1 105 June 2013
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O P I N I O N VOL.1, NO.1 JUNE 2013
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MESSAGE OF PATRON The depth of know
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Part-1 Global / R
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Introduction SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
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Hydropower Resources. Tajikistan is
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post-Arab Spring transition in the
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Opportunities • Russian aspiratio
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Infrastructural Development It
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Introduction AL QAEDA AND THE MUSLI
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Attacks in mainland USA - 09 Sep 20
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of peace negotiations, saying that
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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Aft
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Reactive Strategy against Al Qaeda.
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Deportation / Repatriation of Illeg
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COERCIVE STATECRAFT "The most compl
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US Coercion of USSR - Cuban Missile
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Indian Coercion of Pakistan - Opera
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• Determine the punishment regime
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other states, or produce counter na
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Introduction RISING INDIA - A CRITI
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protecting Indian investments overs
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India’s Military. Indian military
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India has neither been able to prod
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In an idealistic scenario, where In
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Introduction RISING POWERS AND GLOB
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come to dominate the 21 st century
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In the face of the growing importan
Page 55 and 56:
Better Security Hope in Sight Prosp
Page 57 and 58:
power in central and provincial gov
Page 59 and 60: Introduction ARAB UPRISING - A CRIT
Page 61 and 62: Abd-al-Rab Mansur Al Hadi assumed p
Page 63 and 64: the region of Northwest Africa, wes
Page 65 and 66: Transparency International report f
Page 67 and 68: leading to the best case scenario.
Page 69 and 70: Recommended Areas for Immediate Att
Page 71 and 72: PART - 2 National Security ‣ Glob
Page 73 and 74: the establishment of the Bretton Wo
Page 75 and 76: Globalization and Poverty Alleviati
Page 77 and 78: years and yet an air of distrust st
Page 79 and 80: can cause capital flight, which is
Page 81 and 82: Imperatives for Reaping the Benefit
Page 83 and 84: Conclusion of other hostile element
Page 85 and 86: 58 TasneemNoorani, “MFN Status an
Page 87 and 88: Elections 2014 Joint appeal to the
Page 89 and 90: Tranche 1: began transition in July
Page 91 and 92: PART- IV FUTURE AFGHAN SCENARIOS AN
Page 93 and 94: Indian and Chinese involvement in d
Page 95 and 96: influence and eastern and southern
Page 97 and 98: scenario would have grave implicati
Page 99 and 100: In present day Asia, three big demo
Page 101 and 102: Major Conclusions. Major conclusion
Page 103 and 104: The increase in glacial melting may
Page 105 and 106: Demography. Unplanned expansion of
Page 107 and 108: Legislate to ensure energy efficien
Page 109: 26 http://www.pmd.gov.pk/rnd/rnd_fi
Page 113 and 114: During the conflict, leaders/offici
Page 115 and 116: Pakistan, India, without any formal
Page 117 and 118: or the establishment of stability a
Page 119 and 120: Researchers: Supervisor: Brig Asim
Page 121 and 122: The Stone Age of Campaigning. Durin
Page 123 and 124: Technological Advancements - WW 1 F
Page 125 and 126: American Operational Art - WW II O
Page 127 and 128: war began. By early 1951, the fight
Page 129 and 130: • Freedom of Action for Afghan Fi
Page 131 and 132: WW-2 • Joint Warfare. • Amphibi
Page 133 and 134: 35 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Ame
Page 135 and 136: are not necessarily new. The four e
Page 137 and 138: Fifth Generation Warfare Theoretica
Page 139 and 140: • Terrorists now have transnation
Page 141 and 142: hierarchical organizations. Technol
Page 143 and 144: Conclusion Force Multipliers. Avail
Page 145 and 146: PART - 4 VIEWS ‣ Human Security O
Page 147 and 148: Commission for Human Security, co c
Page 149: 3 P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “W
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