OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
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• Blitzkrieg. This operational method of the German Army along with the use of<br />
Luftwaffe was a revolution in warfare, which was most successfully applied by the<br />
German military to achieve its ambitions in Europe.<br />
• Allied Strategic Errors 19 . It's an old cliché that generals like to re-fight the last<br />
war. The disastrous errors of 1940 can only be seen in this light. One of the<br />
mistakes was over-reliance on the Maginot line and the other was the abandonment<br />
of prepared fortified positions by the Allies to resist the Germans in an open and<br />
unfamiliar territory, which set the scene for the great disaster.<br />
• The Germans were able to strike the French Centre of Gravity (COG) - Paris and<br />
made enemy’s system of forces imbalanced by coaxing them into Belgium while<br />
exploiting the thinly held Ardennes and Stenay Gap, resulting into surrender of<br />
three fifth of France’s territory to Germany 20 .<br />
Operation Barbarossa. Earlier successes with frontal pressure and deep penetration<br />
notwithstanding, the Germans could not hold on long enough to capitalize on their gains,<br />
thus falling short of their strategic aim. Hitler’s decision of not getting Moscow but to go<br />
for Ukraine’s resources diverted him from hitting the COG (Moscow), which led the<br />
Germans system of forces to be imbalanced subsequently. Despite heavy losses to<br />
Russians in men and material, the German forces could not take them to their culminating<br />
point 21 and thus the Germans were forced to surrender on 8 May 1945.<br />
Few other factors impacting the German operational art negatively during WW-II were<br />
grossly underestimated mobilization potential of the Red Army. German logistic<br />
weaknesses made it extremely difficult to sustain their mobility and armament industry had<br />
limited production.<br />
Operational Art in Russia – WW II. It was not until 1943 that the Russians emerged with a<br />
much better version of operational art. They had quite correctly realized their weaknesses after<br />
their initial failures and had raised tank and mechanized corps to spearhead their offensive<br />
operations. A brief explanation of some of the major campaigns fought by the Red Army during<br />
WW-II is:-<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Soviet Counter Offensive<br />
• Stalingrad (Operation Uranus). Russians were able to successfully maintain<br />
balance despite suffering more casualties than the Germans. Their actions led to<br />
the Germans losing their much desired tempo of operations 22 . The decisive victory<br />
demonstrated the Red Army’s mastery of operational art. 23<br />
• The Belorussian Offensive (Jun-Aug 1943). The Soviets reinforced Germans’<br />
misperception by deliberately posturing offensively in the South, while secretly<br />
moving large mobile formations northward into Belorussia, inflicting devastating<br />
defeat on German Army Group Centre 24 .<br />
• Germans being overextended, could not improve their defensive posture and were<br />
thus not in a state of balance; the Russians were able to correctly exploit this<br />
imbalance 25 .<br />
Deep-Battle Theory 26 . During the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet military theorists introduced<br />
the concept of deep battle, which was formally evolved in the Russian Field Manual in<br />
year 1936 by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Salient contours of the theory included<br />
Deep Operations encompassed manoeuvre by multiple corps or army sized formations<br />
simultaneously, and it was not meant to deliver a victory in a single operation, but instead<br />
multiple operations conducted in parallel or successively.<br />
From Stalingrad to Berlin during 1943 to 1945, the Soviets perfected sequential and<br />
simultaneous operations. Stalin’s marshals learned to command and control these<br />
operations in depth and breadth, while coordinating air support with armoured thrusts.<br />
These successes signify Russian operational art during WW-II 27 .<br />
<strong>OPINION</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong> <strong>No.1</strong> 118 <strong>June</strong> <strong>2013</strong>