OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

AFGHANISTAN – PRE AND POST 2014: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN
Pakistan has borne the brunt of the fallout of Afghan crisis in the past three decades, as
Afghanistan’s closest neighbour. The costs incurred by Pakistan in blood and treasure are simply
incalculable. The impact of the developments has practically transformed Pakistan’s national security
perspective and environment. The critical questions are: where does Afghanistan stand today What it
means for Pakistan when combat and security responsibilities would be transferred to the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF), after the scheduled withdrawal of the bulk of US/NATO/ISAF forces
in 2014
Political and Socio-Economic Environment
The Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001 1 has been a success in the sense that all the major
milestones of the given road map have been achieved: the Interim Authority was established; the
Emergency Loya Jirga was held which established the Transitional Authority under President Karzai; the
Constitutional Loya Jirga was held in Kabul which approved the new Afghan Constitution on 4 January
2004. Presidential elections have been held twice: in October 2004 and November 2009. Parliamentary
elections were held on 18 September 2005 and 18 September 2010.
Political Environment
Yet the process of political transition appears to have run parallel of the Afghan conflict instead
of serving as the key instrument of resolving it. Today, a decade after the implementation of Bonn
Agreement, nothing can be said with any degree of certainty about Afghanistan’s political future, notably
after the drawdown of foreign forces. Taliban-led insurgency is raging throughout the country. Writ of
Karzai-led government “only weakly extends beyond the outskirts of Kabul” 2 .
So what was wrong with the Bonn process In nutshell, it failed to address the fundamental issue
of reconciling the ethnic divisions in Afghanistan. Concluded in a haste to fill the power vacuum in
Kabul as the Taliban regime was crumbling under heavy US bombing, the Bonn Agreement brought
together the “winners of the US led Operation Enduring Freedom” and “not the warring parties”. Bonn
“did not try to reconcile the differences between the warring parties or attempt to draw ‘moderate’
members of the defeated party the Taliban in the process of government reestablishment or state
creation.” 3
The ethnic imbalance flowing from Bonn Agreement was reflected in the composition of the
Interim Authority. It “gave control of key ministries to the Tajiks, specially the Panjshiris, and Northern
Alliance who at the time of the conference controlled Kabul” 4 . The attempt to fix the imbalance in the
Transitional Authority, through enhancing Pashtun representation, proved to be insignificant, as far as the
Pashtuns were concerned. It triggered a Tajik backlash which led to the subsequent rift between Karzai
and his Tajik allies.
The Reconciliation Process
The 2010 Loya Jirga authorized Karzai to begin talks with Taliban and other groups. A Higher
Peace Council (HPC) was established under late Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. The HPC received a
severe blow when Rabbani was assassinated in September 2011.
Meanwhile, President Obama, during his draw-down speech on 22 June 2011 stated that
"America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban. Our position on
these talks is clear: they must be led by the Afghan government, and those who want to be a part of a
peaceful Afghanistan must break from Al-Qaeda, abandon violence, and abide by the Afghan
Constitution”. Obama Administration now regards Mullah Omar as a critical figure in its efforts to
organize peace talks between the Taliban and Karzai. 5
The second, a domestic reconciliation process, is underway between the Taliban and the Afghan
Government. President Karzai, while inviting Taliban for direct talks and political reconciliation,
requested help from Pakistan. On its part, Pakistan was very quick and responsive. Former Prime
Minister Gillani appealed to the Taliban leadership and all other Afghan groups, including Hizb-i-Islami,
to participate in an intra-Afghan process for national reconciliation and peace.
Most recently, Afghan reconciliation was discussed during the visits to Pakistan of Salahuddin
Rabbani, Chairman Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) on 12-15 November 2012; and Afghan Foreign
Minister, Zalmai Rassoul, on 30 November 2012. Following is the gist of the two Joint Statements: 6
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 80 June 2013