OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
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Technological Advancements – WW 1<br />
Few major developments, which impacted operational art during WW-1 included inventions of<br />
machine guns, tanks, submarines (German U-Boats) and the wireless equipped aircrafts. Chemical<br />
warfare was also one of the components of WW-1; however, the killing capacity was limited only to 4%<br />
of combat deaths.<br />
Inter War Years. Inter war period was used by the militaries to further develop the operational art.<br />
Country wise summary of interwar period is given below.<br />
Germany<br />
The Germans began to move their army from Sitzkrieg to Blitzkrieg. They developed from<br />
static mass and firepower to dynamic use of manoeuvrability and flexibility. 13<br />
Russia<br />
Russian modernization in the art of warfare can be credited to two names; Svechin and<br />
Tukhachevsky. However, the senseless purge undertaken by Stalin thereafter, adversely affected<br />
this transition and even the performance of Russian Army in the initial part of WW-II.<br />
General Svechin in a series of lectures on strategy in 1923–24, for the first time coined the<br />
term operational art. He described operational art as,<br />
‘the bridge between tactics and strategy, the means by which the senior<br />
commander transformed a series of tactical successes into operational “bounds”<br />
linked together by the commander’s intent and plan and contributing to strategic<br />
success in a given theatre of military actions.’ 14<br />
The principles of operational art outlined in the 1936 Field Regulations bore<br />
Tukhachevsky’s imprint 15 (Mikhail Tukhachevsky 1893–1937), in which no aspect of technology<br />
associated with the conduct of deep operations escaped his attention (i.e. armour, mechanized<br />
infantry, aviation, artillery and rockets and even engineers and radio communications).<br />
United States<br />
A great deal of effort went into extracting lessons from the AEF’s experiences in 1918.<br />
American operational art remained centered on the idea of applying as much combat power as<br />
possible to achieve a decision on the battlefield with emphasis on coordination between land and<br />
naval forces and the air elements of both. 16<br />
Britain<br />
The vivid experience of WW I was most influential in development of the thinking of<br />
J.F.C Fuller and B.H Liddell-Hart:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
World War - II (1939-1945)<br />
JFC Fuller. By 1930s, Fuller had postulated that future wars would have high tempo of<br />
action, unpredictability of events and depth of the battlefield. He had realized that battles<br />
were likely to become more and more area operations and not merely positional ones. 17<br />
Liddell-Hart. In his works, the stress was on movement and surprise. He sought strategic<br />
dislocation through mystification of the enemy.<br />
Both Fuller and Liddell-Hart converged upon similar concepts that anticipated the<br />
evolution of operational art. 18<br />
Operational Art in Germany – WW II. Germany initiated WW II by invading Poland on<br />
1 September 1939, with a mindset of certain victory. German units had no match as they<br />
imbalanced the system of Polish forces, who reached their culminating point by 6 October 1939.<br />
However, the invasion triggered a global conflict, the scale of which proved to exceed the German<br />
grasp of operational art.<br />
Fall of France. France had excellent defensive fortifications in the form of Maginot Line<br />
and better tanks than the German Panzers, but they lost to the German’s Blitzkrieg. Some<br />
of the pertinent facets of this offensive were:-<br />
<strong>OPINION</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong> <strong>No.1</strong> 117 <strong>June</strong> <strong>2013</strong>