OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

scenario would have grave implications for Pakistan in terms of aggravation of the phenomenon of
terrorism and extremism, with devastating impact on Pakistan’s national security, foreign relations,
national cohesion and unity, economy and image.
In the more likely scenario, Afghanistan, while tumbling through odds, would ultimately
stabilize in the mid to long term perspective. The first decade or so after the drawdown would, in any
scenario, be highly volatile and full of challenges for both Afghanistan itself, as well as Pakistan. This
scenario is based on the assumptions that: the reconciliation process would succeed in bringing about a
power sharing arrangement with the dominant Taliban faction; the potency and cohesion of ANSF
would be ensured; financial support to the Kabul set-up would be guaranteed; regional players would not
have the temptation to fill any vacuum. And these rather optimistic assumptions are in turn based on the
facts that: the US has finally turned around towards reconciliation (Kabul regime was already
convinced); the Taliban, on their part have shown willingness to engage in negotiations; the regional
players have vital stakes in peace and stability in Afghanistan and do not stand to gain anything from the
continuing violence and turmoil. The interests of internal as well as external players, thus, practically
converge at this juncture, on restoration and peace and stability in Afghanistan, rather than continuation
of the conflict and violence.
Researcher:
Supervisor:
By: Amb Aslam Khan, Brig Rizwan Rafi, Col William Sterling (USA), Lt Col Shuja Anwar
Brig Najeeb Ahmed
Endnotes
1 www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm
2 Johnson Thomas H., Afghanistan’s post-Taliban Transition--the state of state-building after war, p1, accessed at
http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pubs/Central
3 Brumberg, Daniel and Shehata, Dina, Conflict, Identify, and Reform in the Muslim World-Challenges for US
Engagement. United States Institute for Peace, Wahington.2009.P.175.
4 ibid
5 Steve Coll, “Looking for Mullah Omar”, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/23/120123fa_fact_coll,
Accessed October 21, 2012.
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs press releases dated 15 and 30 November 2012 accessed at: http://www.mofa.gov.pk
7 Javid Ahmed, Elections 2014 – Afghans Chance to Get it
Right,http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/10/election_2014_afghanistans_chance_to_get_it_right.
Accessed October 2, 2012.
8 Chicago Summit Declaration – 2012,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htmmode=pressrelease.Accessed October, 6, 2012.
9 Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and US Policy, Congressional Research Services.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/174244.pdf. Accessed September, 30, 2012.
10 Rotberg Robert, Building a new Afghanistan Lahore, (Lahore, Vanguard Books, 2009), 102.
11 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Rise of the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); A. Giustozzi, Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects
(New York: The Century Foundation, June 2010).
12 Mullah Omar, in “First interview with the Islamic Emirate Magazine,” undated, probably late 1990 or early 2000s;
www.alemarh.com, via Archive (page saved Aug 2001).
13 Institute for the Study of War, “Hizb-i-IslamiGulbuddin (HIG)” http://www.understandingwar.org/hizb-i-islamigulbuddin-hig
14 A profile of the faction and its activities is provided in: Joshua Partlow. “In Afghan War, Haqqani Group Is
‘Resilient’ Foe.” Washington Post, May 30, 2011.
15 “Thus, ideal cooperation between Afghanistan and the region depends on the degree to which regional issues
such as the Kashmir problem can be resolved.” Haroun Mir, “Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, “Is a
Regional Strategy Viable for Afghanistan” p.9
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 91 June 2013