OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Employment of Air Power during the Great Wars From the use of static balloons, air reconnaissance and limited support to land operations during WW I, it evolved into provision of close air support, strategic bombing, airborne operations and even use of air-launched torpedoes during WW II. PART II THE COLD WAR ERA (1946 TO 1975) Sequel to the advent of nuclear weapons, an important debate started having crucial implications for operational art in the period after WW-II. A new strategic environment had been created in which armed conflict had to be either avoided (through coercive diplomacy) or contained (by a limited war). This part covers the period from 1946 to 1975 and primarily focuses on the Chinese civil war, Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1960-75). The Chinese Civil War Chinese civil war (of 1946-1949) was fought between the armies of the Nationalist government of China and Communist armies under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. During this war, the military forces numbering in millions fought across the vast space of China in a struggle that ended with the Nationalist government taking refuge on the island province of Taiwan and the Communists establishing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 31 . Chairman Mao defeated the nationalist forces in a series of sequential battles and engagements by applying the operational art in three phases 32 :- Phase 1 • A strategic withdrawal was conducted into the Chinese countryside, avoiding set piece battles with the numerically stronger and better equipped Nationalist forces, overextending their lines of communication, and degrading their combat power. • Mao's plan of strategic withdrawal protected his COG (the Red Army) from destruction (by avoiding pitched battles), while the Nationalists’ COG (which lied in their military forces) was continuously degraded. Phase 2. Extended lines of communication of dispersed Nationalist forces into isolated cities were subjected to persistent interdiction, which hastened their culminating point at strategic and operational levels, while the Red Army continued to grow stronger in the countryside. Phase 3. Launching of the strategic offensive and forcing the Nationalists to retreat caused dispersion and isolation in their urban strongholds, rendering them unbalanced and vulnerable to destruction. The entire communist command and control structure shared a common view of the desired end state of the civil war. Chairman Mao successfully "developed and disseminated a unified and holistic approach in the design, execution and sustainment" of the War, which ultimately led them to success. The communists exploited the "close relationship between force deployment, campaign design and geography", through application of the idea of distributed deployment. Throughout the Chinese civil war the primary means of logistic support to the Red Army were the Chinese peasants and their base areas. Secondary means included capturing Nationalist Army’s supplies and equipment. The Korean War (1950 – 53) It was in 1950, that the communist North Korea invaded anti-communist South Korea, and the United States immediately intervened in the conflict by sending combat troops to aid the South. The communists had captured more than 90 % of the Korean Peninsula. While the South Koreans were at the brink of defeat, a brilliant amphibious counterattack engineered by General Douglas MacArthur behind the enemy lines at Inchon, quickly drove the North Koreans back across the border. Now the Americans surged forward, driving North hoping to entirely liberate North Korea from the communist rule. But just as MacArthur declared victory to be at hand, he was caught completely off-guard by the Chinese advance of November 1950. An overwhelming number of Chinese soldiers unexpectedly poured into Korea, sending the Americans into a desperate retreat. Eventually the Americans were able to re-establish a defensive line, ironically located almost at the 38 th Parallel—the line that had divided North and South Korea before the OPINION Vol.1 No.1 120 June 2013
war began. By early 1951, the fighting settled into an uneasy stalemate. Active combat involving UN forces in Korea ended in 1953 with the signing of a cease-fire 33 . MacArthur - Truman Rift 34 . The American intervention in the Korean peninsula saved South Korea from a collapse, but efforts to go further, with an objective to roll back the communist North Korean regime, ended in defeat and bitter acrimony between the operational commander (Mac Arthur) and the political strategist (President Truman). And finally, Truman relieved Gen McArthur of his command over American forces in Korea. The notion of balance was in favour of the UN forces till the Chinese counter offensive. However, thereafter, Chinese surprised advance critically imbalanced the US system of forces, which ultimately resulted in their retreat to 38 th Parallel and making them reach their culmination. As a whole, the UN Forces’ COG rested in their alliance, whereas on the other hand, with the involvement of the Chinese People’s Army in November 1950, it became the Communists’ COG. The Vietnam War (1964 – 75) Vietnam War was fought between North Vietnam, supported by its communist allies and the government of South Vietnam, supported mainly by the US. During ten most brutal years of the Vietnam War (1965 – 75), USA clung into two fatal illusions: firstly, it assumed that military might and superior firepower would win the war, which it grossly underestimated and; secondly, it misunderstood, the fierce nationalism that drove the Vietnamese resistance. American operational art although assumed that winning tactical battles would lead ultimately to winning wars and it also won almost all of them, however, still in the end those victories were not enough. The U.S. failed to achieve its strategic objectives. The reasons for this defeat in Vietnam were numerous and complicated, however, one of them was the failure of U.S. military to practice the operational art 35 . Phases of the War. There were three basic phases of U.S. military’s involvement in Vietnam:- • The first phase ran from withdrawal of the French military in 1956 to employment of U.S. forces in late 1964 in support of South Vietnamese forces, (there was no employment of U.S. forces in a direct combat role). • The second phase began with the decision to commit U.S. combat forces in 1965 and ran through the decision to begin withdrawal in 1968. (U.S. forces conducted the majority of combat operations in the theatre). • The third and last phase was from the decision to begin the programme of Vietnamization in 1969 to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Significant Fault Lines in US Operational Art – Vietnam War. During this prolonged war, a number of misjudgements became major fault lines of US Army’s employment in Vietnam 36 , like:- • Absence of a Campaign Plan. The integration of battles and engagements into an overall major operation or campaign was neither well planned nor executed. The strategy of attrition through repeated battles without any linkage ceded the initiative to the enemy and forced the U.S. to fight on the enemy's terms. • The strategy of Military Assistance Command of Vietnam lacked an integrated plan to work with other elements of national power. • There were visible cleavages between the political and military leadership, as Gen Westmoreland the operational commander had developed a serious rift with Ambassador Henry Lodge (a representative of President Johnson). The General lost sight of the strategic objective and thus failed to maintain subordination of the military mission to the political object. For approximately fifteen years, the North Vietnamese fought against US and South Vietnam. After withdrawal of American combat troops in 1973, South Vietnam fell to the North in 1975 resulting into unification of Vietnam under the communist government in July 1976. US Army had decisively failed to achieve its objectives and thus a nation accustomed to grand victories of the world wars suffered its first major defeat. OPINION Vol.1 No.1 121 June 2013
Page 1 and 2:
O P I N I O N VOL.1, NO.1 JUNE 2013
Page 3 and 4:
MESSAGE OF PATRON The depth of know
Page 5 and 6:
TABLE OF CONTENTS Part-1 Global / R
Page 7 and 8:
Introduction SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
Page 9 and 10:
Hydropower Resources. Tajikistan is
Page 11 and 12:
post-Arab Spring transition in the
Page 13 and 14:
Opportunities • Russian aspiratio
Page 15 and 16:
Infrastructural Development It
Page 17 and 18:
Introduction AL QAEDA AND THE MUSLI
Page 19 and 20:
Attacks in mainland USA - 09 Sep 20
Page 21 and 22:
of peace negotiations, saying that
Page 23 and 24:
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Aft
Page 25 and 26:
Reactive Strategy against Al Qaeda.
Page 27 and 28:
Deportation / Repatriation of Illeg
Page 29 and 30:
COERCIVE STATECRAFT "The most compl
Page 31 and 32:
US Coercion of USSR - Cuban Missile
Page 33 and 34:
Indian Coercion of Pakistan - Opera
Page 35 and 36:
• Determine the punishment regime
Page 37 and 38:
other states, or produce counter na
Page 39 and 40:
Introduction RISING INDIA - A CRITI
Page 41 and 42:
protecting Indian investments overs
Page 43 and 44:
India’s Military. Indian military
Page 45 and 46:
India has neither been able to prod
Page 47 and 48:
In an idealistic scenario, where In
Page 49 and 50:
Introduction RISING POWERS AND GLOB
Page 51 and 52:
come to dominate the 21 st century
Page 53 and 54:
In the face of the growing importan
Page 55 and 56:
Better Security Hope in Sight Prosp
Page 57 and 58:
power in central and provincial gov
Page 59 and 60:
Introduction ARAB UPRISING - A CRIT
Page 61 and 62:
Abd-al-Rab Mansur Al Hadi assumed p
Page 63 and 64:
the region of Northwest Africa, wes
Page 65 and 66:
Transparency International report f
Page 67 and 68:
leading to the best case scenario.
Page 69 and 70:
Recommended Areas for Immediate Att
Page 71 and 72:
PART - 2 National Security ‣ Glob
Page 73 and 74:
the establishment of the Bretton Wo
Page 75 and 76: Globalization and Poverty Alleviati
Page 77 and 78: years and yet an air of distrust st
Page 79 and 80: can cause capital flight, which is
Page 81 and 82: Imperatives for Reaping the Benefit
Page 83 and 84: Conclusion of other hostile element
Page 85 and 86: 58 TasneemNoorani, “MFN Status an
Page 87 and 88: Elections 2014 Joint appeal to the
Page 89 and 90: Tranche 1: began transition in July
Page 91 and 92: PART- IV FUTURE AFGHAN SCENARIOS AN
Page 93 and 94: Indian and Chinese involvement in d
Page 95 and 96: influence and eastern and southern
Page 97 and 98: scenario would have grave implicati
Page 99 and 100: In present day Asia, three big demo
Page 101 and 102: Major Conclusions. Major conclusion
Page 103 and 104: The increase in glacial melting may
Page 105 and 106: Demography. Unplanned expansion of
Page 107 and 108: Legislate to ensure energy efficien
Page 109 and 110: 26 http://www.pmd.gov.pk/rnd/rnd_fi
Page 111 and 112: INDO - PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE
Page 113 and 114: During the conflict, leaders/offici
Page 115 and 116: Pakistan, India, without any formal
Page 117 and 118: or the establishment of stability a
Page 119 and 120: Researchers: Supervisor: Brig Asim
Page 121 and 122: The Stone Age of Campaigning. Durin
Page 123 and 124: Technological Advancements - WW 1 F
Page 125: American Operational Art - WW II O
Page 129 and 130: • Freedom of Action for Afghan Fi
Page 131 and 132: WW-2 • Joint Warfare. • Amphibi
Page 133 and 134: 35 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Ame
Page 135 and 136: are not necessarily new. The four e
Page 137 and 138: Fifth Generation Warfare Theoretica
Page 139 and 140: • Terrorists now have transnation
Page 141 and 142: hierarchical organizations. Technol
Page 143 and 144: Conclusion Force Multipliers. Avail
Page 145 and 146: PART - 4 VIEWS ‣ Human Security O
Page 147 and 148: Commission for Human Security, co c
Page 149: 3 P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “W
show all

OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?