OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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strikes, is the only available option to implement a policy of coercive diplomacy. Such strategists obviously miss the point as to how a limited conflict can be controlled since the loser would naturally be tempted to seek reversal of its losses while the victor would be encouraged to maximize its gains. Both these possibilities would push the conflict up the escalation ladder with minimal chances of restraint. Kashmir – Central to All Disputes Current shift in the focus notwithstanding, Kashmir remains central to all disputes between India and Pakistan 18 . It has either been the main theatre of Indo – Pakistan conflicts or the main cause of their bilateral crises over the years. While portraying the indigenous freedom struggle as foreign sponsored and supported militancy in Kashmir, India downplays the root causes of the conflict which include forcible occupation against the wishes of its people, blatant violation of UN Resolutions, and denial of basic human rights to its citizens. It has probably dawned upon the leadership of both countries that keeping it a zerosum game has not and will not benefit anyone and by making compromises rather than maximalist rhetoric which becomes counterproductive, they can hope to see a solution to this chronic problem. However, any thought of making compromises pushes the leadership of both India and Pakistan into a paradoxical situation. The dilemma for them is how to make concessions and still be able to claim victory. Getting both sides to a win-win situation has proved to be an elusive objective and beyond the acumen of the policymakers of both countries for the past two generations. This, in the absence of any third party mediation/guidance, ultimately leads the whole process to a blind alley. Nuclear Weapons Avert War But Do Not Make Peace The Indo – Pakistan crises under focus reveal that nuclear weapons did deter escalation to a general war but did not prevent Kargil Conflict as well as omnipresent sub conventional war between the two countries. The threat of a nuclear war also brings in outside powers with their vested interests in the region. None of the crises transcended to nuclear domain which is certainly reflective of the responsible attitudes of both countries. Therefore, it seems unlikely, that either would use a nuclear weapon in a conventional war except as a last resort, when vital interests are perceived to be in jeopardy. The strategic stability driven instability, germinated at lower levels, yields a vitiated environment marked by a perpetual state of sub conventional conflict and expression of hostilities through other non-kinetic subtle means. Hence war certainly remains averted but achievement of peace also becomes an unrealizable dream. The Role of Media The unprecedented role and clout acquired by media since Gulf War - 1 had an anticipated impact on perception management of public in South Asia during crises. The mushrooming of private television channels and cable networks in both countries has effectively superseded the state-controlled media in credibility and coverage. Kargil was South Asia’s first war under the glare of media. Indian media orchestrated a brilliant campaign to highlight Pakistani culpability and shape domestic and international opinion in India’s favour. Now a network of think tanks, independent scholars, non governmental organizations and a much better informed political community has arisen to challenge government policy on vital matters 19 . The practices of the yore which allowed concealing of the facts under the thick fog of concocted stories about the outcome of military operations may not now be possible under the sharp focus of media and embedded journalism has added even greater transparency to it. Media has played and will continue to play a predominant role in building the public opinion in support or otherwise of future crises/escalation control and taking the South Asian region towards dispute resolution and durable peace. Conclusion Overt nuclearization of South Asia, though expected to bring a period of greater stability, has not deterred sub-conventional warfare or limited conventional war (1999 Kargil), escalation to the brink of war in 2001-2002 and the possibility of dangerous misadventures like thoughts of surgical strikes in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Both countries applied pressure tactics, resorted to coercive diplomacy and manifested a perpetually hostile foreign policy towards each other but nothing has worked so far to ensure durable peace. Next time the situation may explode suddenly, much before the intervention of any third party, resulting into the destruction of all that we so lovingly cherish. Finding a peaceful settlement of all the contending issues, including and most importantly Kashmir, to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned would be a litmus test of the statesmanship of leaders of both the countries – a real test in which failure is no more an option. OPINION Vol.1 No.1 112 June 2013
Researchers: Supervisor: Brig Asim Munir, Cdr Faisal Shah PN, Lt Col Kshif Zafar and Dr Fida Wazir Brig Mahmood Sadiq Endnotes 1 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947 – 2005, A Concise History, Oxford University Press 2007. 2 Ishtiaq Ahmed, “The 1947 Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in India and Pakistan”, Asian Ethnicity, p. 9 (March 2002). 3 “Musharraf Blames India for Unrest in Balochistan”, Daily Times, 5 August 2008. 4 General VP Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006), p132-133. 5 Bruce Reidel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, p.11. 6 P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, (HarperCollins Publishers India), 2008, p.149. 7 P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, p.160 8 Zachary S. Davis, The India – Pakistan Military Standoff, Crisis and Escalation in South Asia, (Palgrave MacMillan Press, USA), 2011, p.135. 9 Gaurav Kampani, India’s Compellance Strategy, Calling Pakistan’s Nuclear Bluff over Kashmir. 10 “India Demands Strong Swift Action”, News, 2 December 2008. 11 Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, “From Great Game to Grand Bargain”, Daily Times, 12 November 2008. 12 “Zardari, Gilani Condemn”, News, 28 November 2008 13 “Mumbai Probe Put on Fast Track”, News, 18 January 2009. 14 Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006. 15 P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, p.199. 16 P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, p.197. 17 Feroz Hassan Khan, The Independence – Dependence Paradox, in Arms Control Today, October 2003 and P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, p.193. 18 P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, p.214. 19 P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, p.186. OPINION Vol.1 No.1 113 June 2013
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O P I N I O N VOL.1, NO.1 JUNE 2013
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MESSAGE OF PATRON The depth of know
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Part-1 Global / R
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Introduction SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
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Hydropower Resources. Tajikistan is
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post-Arab Spring transition in the
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Opportunities • Russian aspiratio
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Infrastructural Development It
Page 17 and 18:
Introduction AL QAEDA AND THE MUSLI
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Attacks in mainland USA - 09 Sep 20
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of peace negotiations, saying that
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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Aft
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Reactive Strategy against Al Qaeda.
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Deportation / Repatriation of Illeg
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COERCIVE STATECRAFT "The most compl
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US Coercion of USSR - Cuban Missile
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Indian Coercion of Pakistan - Opera
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• Determine the punishment regime
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other states, or produce counter na
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Introduction RISING INDIA - A CRITI
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protecting Indian investments overs
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India’s Military. Indian military
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India has neither been able to prod
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In an idealistic scenario, where In
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Introduction RISING POWERS AND GLOB
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come to dominate the 21 st century
Page 53 and 54:
In the face of the growing importan
Page 55 and 56:
Better Security Hope in Sight Prosp
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power in central and provincial gov
Page 59 and 60:
Introduction ARAB UPRISING - A CRIT
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Abd-al-Rab Mansur Al Hadi assumed p
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the region of Northwest Africa, wes
Page 65 and 66:
Transparency International report f
Page 67 and 68: leading to the best case scenario.
Page 69 and 70: Recommended Areas for Immediate Att
Page 71 and 72: PART - 2 National Security ‣ Glob
Page 73 and 74: the establishment of the Bretton Wo
Page 75 and 76: Globalization and Poverty Alleviati
Page 77 and 78: years and yet an air of distrust st
Page 79 and 80: can cause capital flight, which is
Page 81 and 82: Imperatives for Reaping the Benefit
Page 83 and 84: Conclusion of other hostile element
Page 85 and 86: 58 TasneemNoorani, “MFN Status an
Page 87 and 88: Elections 2014 Joint appeal to the
Page 89 and 90: Tranche 1: began transition in July
Page 91 and 92: PART- IV FUTURE AFGHAN SCENARIOS AN
Page 93 and 94: Indian and Chinese involvement in d
Page 95 and 96: influence and eastern and southern
Page 97 and 98: scenario would have grave implicati
Page 99 and 100: In present day Asia, three big demo
Page 101 and 102: Major Conclusions. Major conclusion
Page 103 and 104: The increase in glacial melting may
Page 105 and 106: Demography. Unplanned expansion of
Page 107 and 108: Legislate to ensure energy efficien
Page 109 and 110: 26 http://www.pmd.gov.pk/rnd/rnd_fi
Page 111 and 112: INDO - PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE
Page 113 and 114: During the conflict, leaders/offici
Page 115 and 116: Pakistan, India, without any formal
Page 117: or the establishment of stability a
Page 121 and 122: The Stone Age of Campaigning. Durin
Page 123 and 124: Technological Advancements - WW 1 F
Page 125 and 126: American Operational Art - WW II O
Page 127 and 128: war began. By early 1951, the fight
Page 129 and 130: • Freedom of Action for Afghan Fi
Page 131 and 132: WW-2 • Joint Warfare. • Amphibi
Page 133 and 134: 35 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Ame
Page 135 and 136: are not necessarily new. The four e
Page 137 and 138: Fifth Generation Warfare Theoretica
Page 139 and 140: • Terrorists now have transnation
Page 141 and 142: hierarchical organizations. Technol
Page 143 and 144: Conclusion Force Multipliers. Avail
Page 145 and 146: PART - 4 VIEWS ‣ Human Security O
Page 147 and 148: Commission for Human Security, co c
Page 149: 3 P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “W
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OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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