OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
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There is a full scale civil war and the wave of violence and religious radicalization spreads over<br />
Pakistan, effectively contributing to increased insecurity and destabilization of Pakistan.<br />
Implications<br />
US and her allies continue implicating Pakistan as an abettor of terrorism.<br />
Continuous presence of US forces in a volatile neighbourhood would pose serious threats to the<br />
internal stability of Pakistan in particular and the region in general.<br />
Drone strikes continue breaching the sovereignty of Pakistan thus inviting public wrath, unless, a<br />
regime change in Pakistan post <strong>2013</strong> general elections reverses the situation.<br />
Pakistan may have to bear extra burden in terms of more refugees from Afghanistan.<br />
Pakistan military overstretches to new extremes.<br />
Narco trade and its nexus with terrorism increases.<br />
Pakistan’s economy remains under continuing stress.<br />
There are four possible policy options for Pakistan:-<br />
PART-V<br />
POLICY OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN<br />
Constructive Engagement: Continue existing policy with necessary modifications and finetuning.<br />
(Recommended)<br />
Regional Approach: Try to seek a solution in concert with Afghanistan’s neighbours, Russia<br />
and China and other regional players. Not advisable. (Not recommended)<br />
Neutrality: Not affordable in view of the porous border and direct impact of Afghan situation on<br />
Pakistan. (Not recommended)<br />
Aggressive Engagement: Try to keep Afghanistan under Pakistan’s sphere of influence, seek to<br />
manipulate internal politics, seek strict harmonization of Afghan policies with those of Pakistan.<br />
Not advisable.(Not recommended)<br />
Elements of Proposed Policy<br />
Conclusion<br />
Support Afghan-led and Afghan-owned solutions.<br />
Coordinate with all key stake holders, namely US, Iran, Russia, CARs, Turkey and China<br />
through existing bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral forums and creating new forums where<br />
necessary.<br />
Work closely with Afghanistan and other stake holders to eliminate terrorism and extremism.<br />
Develop modern border control mechanisms, without restricting legal cross border movement.<br />
Neutrality in dealing with Afghan factions and ethnic groups.<br />
Develop close ties with Afghanistan in conformity with norms of inter-state conduct.<br />
Build mutually beneficial partnerships in transit, trade, connectivity and energy corridors at the<br />
intra and inter regional levels.<br />
Intensify cooperation under OIC, ECO, SCO, UN, NAM, CAREC (Central Asia Regional<br />
Economic Cooperation) and SAARC.<br />
Develop mechanisms for orderly return of refugees.<br />
Afghan situation remains highly volatile and complex. The success of the transitional process<br />
depends on resolving the political conflict, which in turn depends on the success or failure of the<br />
reconciliation process. There are lingering fears that Afghanistan may once again descend into a chaotic<br />
situation after the planned drawdown of US/NATO/ISAF forces in 2014. This would be the likely<br />
scenario if the reconciliation process failed. The situation would further aggravate if the regional players<br />
jumped in to fill the vacuum and support their respective proxies, the way they did during the 1990s. This<br />
<strong>OPINION</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong> <strong>No.1</strong> 90 <strong>June</strong> <strong>2013</strong>