OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

mobilization ever since WW II. The international community led by US maintained a steady politicodiplomatic
pressure on both India and Pakistan to forestall the possibility of armed conflict. With the
intense efforts of global community and Pakistan’s crackdown on militant organizations the crisis seemed
to have subsided by Mar 2002. The full scale deployment of troops however continued. The Second Peak
of Crisis occurred on 14 May 2002, when the militants struck an Indian military camp at Kaluchak near
Jammu and killed as many as 30 people including family members of Indian soldiers. This propelled the
already tense environment to new heights. The worsening crisis initiated steady diplomatic efforts which
culminated in June 2002, when US conveyed to India that Pakistan had agreed to ensure stoppage of such
infiltration permanently 7 . India declared that its objectives had been met and withdrew her troops in
October 2002.
Global and Domestic Environment
The international environment was influenced by 9/11 terror attacks and the international coalition
had attacked Afghanistan to uproot Al Qaeda network. US led Operation Enduring Freedom was underway
in Afghanistan and Taliban regime had been overthrown. Pakistan was the front line ally in GWOT and
had extended facilities to international effort in Afghanistan. Pakistan had deployed troops along Pak
Afghan border to cater for Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants fleeing from Afghanistan. On domestic front,
Pakistan had a military rule and relations with India were improving despite inconclusive Agra Summit.
Decision Making at Strategic Level
India. Under the chairmanship of Prime Minister, the CCS was formally entrusted with the
responsibility of handling the Twin Peaks Crisis. The decisions such as mobilization of armed
forces, and the restraint shown by them were taken unanimously. However, despite seamless
functioning, there existed opaqueness in its decision making process. For instance, full scale
mobilization of armed forces without a clear objective is a case in point.
Pakistan. In Pakistan, General Musharraf was at the center of decision making process. Through
consultations with Services Chiefs, DG ISI, Corps Commanders and Principal Staff Officers, key
decisions were arrived at, while the foreign and other ministries also played their due role.
Pakistan’s clear understanding of the nature of conflict was evident throughout the crisis however;
an established decision making body like Indian CCS was not existent. Concurrent to preparedness
of armed forces, Pakistan denounced terrorism, banned Jihadi Organizations and extended “Olive
Branch” to the Indian leadership.
Impact/Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence
The nuclear weapons remained visible throughout the conflict and did contribute in escalation
control as is evident from following:-
Both India and Pakistan resorted to serial testing of their nuclear capable missiles. India test fired
Agni – II and BrahMos missiles while Pakistan test fired Ghauri, Ghaznavi, Abdali, and Shaheen
missiles, to signal their resolve to each other as well as to international community.
In January 2001, when both sides had fully mobilized, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, the head
of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division highlighted four red lines, the breach of which could prompt
Pakistan’s nuclear response 8 .
Following the Kaluchak incident, the nuclear threat became so palpable that it prompted US to
issue travel advisory to US citizens on 30 th May 2002 and ordered nonessential embassy staff and
all dependents to leave India. Other countries also followed suit which became a turning point in
conflict due to exodus of foreigners from India hurting its economy gravely.
Role of US in De- escalation
The US had important interests at stake which ultimately helped bring the crisis to an end. Some of
the US interests in managing the crisis were: avoidance of negative fallout on OEF, averting the possibility
of nuclear war and desire to retain both India and Pakistan as allies.
Strategic Coercion
During the Twin Peaks Crisis, Indian government’s deliberate decision to resort to coercion was
based on a perception that drawing analogy between 9/11 and Twin Peaks Crisis would create an overall
favourable environment to pressure Pakistan over Kashmir. In spite of outright condemnations of attack by
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 108 June 2013