OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
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• There have been significant political changes since the end of World War II and number of<br />
states has increased from 51 in 1945 to 194 now with theoretically same importance in<br />
international system.<br />
• Rise in the number of stateless actors to include both transnational and sub-national<br />
elements that influence the international scene is another change which is eroding state<br />
sovereignty.<br />
• As the inter-state wars receded due to their global unacceptability and economic costs,<br />
states and non-state actors resorted to low intensity conflicts to further their political aims.<br />
• 4GW theorists’ also visualised contemporary terrorist groups as self-sufficient since<br />
conflicts will be waged outside the nation-state framework. However, as we have already<br />
seen in Swat and FATA, that is hardly the case as while the State of Pakistan was fighting<br />
these groups, they were also being supported by few states, states thus remain relevant in<br />
fighting or supporting these groups.<br />
• In nutshell, the “end of nation state” approach is too deterministic giving an impression<br />
that it is an inescapable process.<br />
Weak Understanding of Clausewitzian Trinity. One more addition was made by declaring this<br />
war as non-Trinitarian by viewing the trinity as loose interface among the government, military<br />
and the people while ignoring the trinity of basic hostility (drives the desire for conflict), chance<br />
and uncertainty or non-rationality (makes war unpredictable and resistant to prescriptive solutions),<br />
and the purpose (element of subordination or rationality) 6 . Going over the history of disturbances<br />
in Swat and FATA, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Sharia Muhammadi (TNSM) was supported by people in<br />
1994 and was thus able to create some sort of trinity. But as government promises remained<br />
unfulfilled, basic hostility increased and TNSM decided to include TTP Swat Chapter as its armed<br />
group. Inclusion of TTS gave birth to chance and friction and this friction widened as TTS misused<br />
its power thus resulting into loss of support and breaking trinity. Trinity thus remains central to<br />
war fighting and till the time State of Pakistan failed in establishing trinity of people, armed forces<br />
and government no worthwhile operations were possible.<br />
Use of Transnational Bases. Super-terrorists of the future were also thought not to have a<br />
“traditional” national base or identity, but rather a “non-national or transnational one, such as an<br />
ideology or a religion” 7 . However, historically, this has also been a norm rather than exception 8 .<br />
Indeed, it characterizes many sub conventional conflicts now in Pakistan and Afghanistan where<br />
religion was and is still being used to hide the actual agenda. Although, we may disagree with the<br />
final end state these groups desire or long for.<br />
Attacking the Will of Enemy. Attacking the will of the enemy was cited as the main objective of<br />
the changing character of war. Incidentally, this has also been a standard norm in the history and<br />
the only difference now is that through access to media and communication means, certain<br />
leverage to their adversary’s political will is being enjoyed by states and non states 9 . Attacks in<br />
urban areas of Pakistan by TTP, Al Qaeda and all other host of affiliates of Al Qaeda were aimed<br />
at attacking the will of the government and people of Pakistan while attacks on LEAs were aimed<br />
at breaking their will. Debates still resonate in the media where government and armed forces are<br />
routinely asked to negotiate and reconcile with these groups after each attack.<br />
Implosion Rather than Integration. Implosion of state was also identified as one the objectives<br />
while not realizing that states still remain important to all terrorist organizations as they wield<br />
power over societies within states. Even though initially subversion of an existing order is<br />
anticipated, ultimately integration is sought even by insurgents. Post-1996 Afghanistan after<br />
Taliban take over stands as a stark example. Implosion followed by integration was also tried in<br />
Swat and SWA but failed when TTS and TTP failed to manage the chaos. Hamas and Hezbollah<br />
are two more interesting examples as they are now part of the very societies they wish to control 10 .<br />
Over Emphasizing Use of Technology. Technologies such as directed energy weapons and<br />
robotics were envisioned to be used by future terrorists. Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistani<br />
groups inside Pakistan fought with most basic of the weapons and almost no technology.<br />
Vietcongs in Vietnam and Afghans in 80s fought with even more primitive weapons but were still<br />
able to dissuade the designs of much larger and better equipped 2 nd and 3 rd generation armies.<br />
<strong>OPINION</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong> <strong>No.1</strong> 130 <strong>June</strong> <strong>2013</strong>