OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
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WW-2<br />
• Joint Warfare.<br />
• Amphibious Operations.<br />
• Manoeuvre (Blitzkrieg / Deep Battle Theory).<br />
• Effective use of airpower (airborne landings / bombers).<br />
• Use of Atomic Bomb - Artist turned into a Technician.<br />
• Use of Radar.<br />
Cold War Era<br />
• Nuclear Deterrence.<br />
• Limited War.<br />
• Counter Insurgency Operations.<br />
• The Proxy wars.<br />
Over Reliance on Strategic Means. Operational artist has certain resources at his disposal for<br />
achieving laid down strategic objectives through conventional means. His operational plan should<br />
thus be self contained, without any looking back towards strategic means, which are at the disposal<br />
of the political strategist (Macarthur’s assertion to Truman during the Korean War to bomb<br />
communist China).<br />
Exploitation of Fleeting Opportunities. There is a need to avoid rigid adherence to the scheme<br />
of manoeuvre and instead exploit whatever opportunities are presented; the enemy should be<br />
fought with and not the plan (American Expeditionary Force – WW I).<br />
Sustained Logistic Support. Logistic support and its continued sustenance during the subsequent<br />
period of war have a significant impact on application of operational art. An extremely motivated,<br />
well trained and well led army can even succumb to drying up of resources due to ineffective<br />
logistic planning [Operation Torch – North African Campaign (WW-II)].<br />
Military Realm – Sub-Conventional Warfare<br />
Operational art in counterinsurgency is a complex series of tactical, operational and strategic<br />
transitions. These transitions require employment of military, political, economic and diplomatic forces in<br />
sequence and simultaneity. Each of these transitions can take weeks and months. There is no well-defined<br />
time for the transition from clearing to holding or holding to building. Timetables are helpful, but it is<br />
important not to declare prematurely that the transitions are complete. Salient conclusions in this regard<br />
are:-<br />
Conclusion<br />
Shared Operational Vision. The entire command and control structure should share a common<br />
view of the desired end state in any conflict. There is a need to develop and disseminate a unified<br />
and holistic approach in the design, execution and sustainment of the operation (Chinese Civil War<br />
– 1949).<br />
Campaign Planning – Operational Linkage. The integration of battles and engagements into an<br />
overall major campaign is a must for planning as well as for execution. The strategy of attrition<br />
through repeated battles without any linkage cedes the initiative to the enemy, leaving the force to<br />
fight on the enemy's terms (Vietnam War – 1974).<br />
Reactionary Application of Force. War favours the side which does not wait for adversary’s<br />
application of force. If the major part of the combat strength remains committed in escort duties,<br />
fortifications and static patrolling, the force is liable to remain reactive and thus cannot enhance its<br />
depth of operations [Russian Invasion of Afghanistan (1979-89)].<br />
In this paper, the effort has been to highlight various perspectives on the evolution of operational<br />
art, with special focus on US, UK, German, Russian and Chinese ways of war. It certainly did not emerge<br />
all at once. Ideas developed, they were tested in wars, and new concepts were built upon them. Over time,<br />
the theory and practise of operational art adapted to accord with contemporary circumstances ensuring its<br />
continued relevance. Even at the sub-conventional front, where the war is now being fought amongst the<br />
people, its application remains most significant.<br />
<strong>OPINION</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong> <strong>No.1</strong> 125 <strong>June</strong> <strong>2013</strong>