OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

• Freedom of Action for Afghan Fighters. Soviets let the Afghan fighters to plan, prepare
and execute any number of counter attacks, with complete freedom of manoeuvre and
consistent choosing of time/place, concentration of force and leverage to quickly
disengage and withdraw into the mountains during critical stages.
• As a whole, the Soviet Army’s COG lied in their political will, whereas on the other
side it was with Afghan fighters. The Soviet commanders could not anticipate the actions
of Afghan fighters due to lack of reliable intelligence, thus limiting their balance in the
war. Similarly, by fighting a protracted war, the Soviets lost the operational tempo, their
combat worth and logistic sustenance, thereby reaching an unanticipated culmination.
Moreover, two third of Russian combat strength remained committed in escort duties,
fortifications and static patrolling thus mostly remaining reactive without enhancing the
depth of operations.
Introduction of Operational Level of War by US (1982 - 86) 40
With the continuation of Afghan War, in 1982 the US Army published FM-100-5, introducing
the idea of “operations,” with Air Land Battle concept and in the 1986 version, the term “operational
art.” The 1982 manual did not overlook the role of weapons of mass destruction, but it did reinforce the
importance of war’s first grammar to American operational art with statements such as `the object of all
operations is to destroy the opposing force'.
The emphasis was even stronger in the 1986 edition, which declared that the “essence of
operational art” was `the identification of the enemy's operational COG and the concentration of superior
combat power against that point to achieve decisive success'. It also stressed the synchronization of
mobility and firepower, not only across the forward line of friendly troops, but also throughout the depth of
the battle area. This provided a way to integrate the various national doctrines of NATO members and
develop Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept.
Widening of Gap – Politics and Warfare. In the American/NATO usage of FM-100-5, quite
specifically widened the gap between politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability
to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, i.e. “a way of battle rather than a way
of war.”
Operational Art in COIN
The term “operational art” describes the use of military forces sequentially or simultaneously; in
battles, campaigns or series of campaigns to achieve strategic aims. But, the result of operational art in a
counterinsurgency campaign like those in Vietnam and Afghanistan is significantly different than a
conventional campaign 41 .
In the context of COIN the form of war has changed from industrial war to war amongst people.
Hence all institutions, their structures and processes which have evolved to conduct industrial war
successfully are unsuited in the new paradigm of war amongst people. Operational art in
counterinsurgency thus appears to be more impressionistic and mosaic with a complex series of tactical,
operational, and strategic transitions. These transitions require the employment of political, diplomatic,
economic and military elements sequentially and simultaneously 42 .
Each of these tactical transitions can take weeks and months. There is no well-defined time for the
transition from clearing to holding or holding to building. Success in one transition sets the conditions for
potential success in the next with unique requirements and difficulties. In conceiving and executing a
counterinsurgency campaign, cultural, historical and societal details of the host nation are vitally
important. One of the principles for constant success is civil-military unity of purpose and coherency of
action throughout a campaign 43 .
The World of the Future
With the 9/11 attack, the role of NSAs got pronounced and the character of war transformed from
being fought between the people (the conventional mode) to amongst the people (the 4GW). While most of
the armed forces of the world were prepared for high-intensity, major conflicts, they now find themselves
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