OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

or the establishment of stability at lower force levels will remain an elusive objective. Absence of such
institutional mechanisms prevents initiation of timely steps to defuse deteriorating situations.
Pattern of Crisis Management
Indo-Pakistan crises appear to escalate uncontrollably towards potential catastrophe and leadership
of both countries tends to avoid decisions and eagerly awaits external intervention. Both states seek to
achieve their ends without war – Pakistan because it might lose and India because it might not win 16 . The
leadership of both countries have shown great sensitivity to the loss of face to their public, hence fervently
hopes for and willingly accepts third party intervention to extricate them from their predicament which is
reflective of the operation of independence – dependence paradox.
Prospects of a Limited War
Ironically, Indians are not prepared to reconcile with the bitter reality that nuclear weapons have
eliminated the space available to India for translating its superiority in conventional arms into political
advantage as Pakistan has effectively been immunized from any reprisals by larger conventional forces of
India. Moreover, in an action – reaction mode of the crisis, which has generally been the tradition in the
past, both sides quickly climb up the escalation ladder and their respective attempts to dominate the
escalation may result into the whole process spinning out of control. From the perspective of escalation
control, moreover, “There will be pressure on the losing side to expand the war in order to reverse the
battlefield decision and pressure on the winning side to further improve its war termination conditions and
hence military operations.” However, experience of Kargil will continue to haunt the military planners of
both countries regarding the existence or otherwise of space for a limited war between the two under
nuclear overhang.
Role of United States in Escalation Control/Crisis Management
The Indo – Pakistan crises saw incremental involvement of US which may instil a wrong
inspiration in the leadership of both countries that they can provoke and escalate such crises to gain
political advantage, since the United States and the international community, in pursuit of their strategic
interests, would not allow the matters to spin out of control. How these crises would have turned out if US
had not intervened is a meaningful question to be asked. The active involvement of US in the region has
given rise to many paradoxes. The nuclear policies of both India and Pakistan now suffer from
independence – dependence paradox while the deterrence equation in South Asia now implicitly depends
on US intervention – a country which both fear in terms of potential threat to their nuclear programmes 17 .
Both India and Pakistan tried to use US to advance their respective interests and by doing so, in fact ended
up mortgaging their freedom of action to the whims of American policymakers who were pursuing their
own agenda. On the whole, the American role has been critical in achieving escalation control during Indo-
Pakistan crises, which is likely to continue in future as well at least till the physical presence of its forces in
the region.
Cold Start Doctrine
Indian Cold Start doctrine, unveiled in April 2004, is designed to position the Indian Army to
conduct limited war against Pakistan, allowing swift retaliation before Pakistan could prepare militarily
and before outsiders could intervene diplomatically. The Cold Start doctrine is plagued with a number of
problems and begs a multitude of questions. How the political, geographical and force related objectives
would be kept limited and limitations so imposed will be respected by the adversary. How in a limited war,
the losing side can be expected to tailor his response strictly in accordance with the tenets of the concept
and refrain from escalating the conflict How a nuclear state like Pakistan can be expected to face a
conventional defeat and the likely destruction of the state indifferently and not resort to the use of ultimate
weapons which it painstakingly developed and maintained to render security to the state These and many
other relevant questions put a big question mark on the Cold Start Doctrine leading to a limited war under
nuclear overhang.
Coercive Diplomacy
India twice backed away from initiating the hostilities during Operation Parakram by taking refuge
behind US dissuasive efforts to cover its weak resolve. Indian leadership also learnt a bitter lesson that
between nuclear rivals, coercive diplomacy, military threats and nuclear brinkmanship produce limited
results and coercion, as a strategy, has its obvious limits. However, a few strategists in India still believe
that under nuclear shadow, a limited, controlled conflict using high – technology long range surgical
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 111 June 2013