Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
Non-ALP Local Defense Forces
Until recently, three main Local Defense Forces (LDFs) were supported by ISAF: (1)
Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS) – aligned to RC-E; (2) Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) – aligned to RC-N; and (3) Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) –
aligned to RC-S and RC-SW. On December 25, 2011, President Karzai called for the
disestablishment of all non-GIRoA-sanctioned LDF. All CIP and CBSS have been demobilized
as of November 2012. ISCI had not been demobilized as of March 31, 2013. NSOCC-A is
working to assist RC-SW in the demobilization process through the ALP program. Indeed, in
some cases, NSOCC-A provides ALP applications to recently demobilized LDF. This transition
option is done with the express requirement that those demobilizing meet “all the same criteria”
of any other ALP candidate and do not simply “crosswalk” from LDF to ALP. This initiative is
addressing ALP development requirements while maintaining sizeable numbers of former LDF
employed under a legitimate GIRoA endorsed program.
ALP Way Ahead
In recognition of the success of the ALP program and the need to extend its reach into new areas,
ISAF has begun to transition the primary supervisory responsibility for established ALP sites to
the ANSF, with U.S. forces moving into tactical overwatch roles in 46 district locations (as of
March 31, 2013) and 74 districts by July 2013. The sustainability and success of these districts,
however, ultimately depends on GIRoA taking increased ownership and responsibility.
In order for a district to transition to tactical overwatch, it must meet the following criteria:
(1) Leadership: The DCOP and ALP Commanders are appointed and in place, and the DCOP
and ALP Commanders are competent and support each other;
(2) Legitimacy: Shura leaders are identified and validated. Seventy percent of the ALP across the
district are approved by a shura and are from the local area. Shura leaders are capable of
maintaining the ALP program. The local populace views the ALP as legitimate;
(3) Logistics: 70 percent of on-hand ALP in districts are regularly receiving MoI pay and have
sufficient weapons, fuel, and ammunition to perform duties. GIRoA district leadership provides
adequate sustainment for ALP across the district;
(4) Security: Each ALP village/element has an identified ANSF support force that can reinforce
all ALP locations. The DCOP is capable of coordinating security actions across the district in
support of ALP;
(5) Manning: 70 percent of the district tashkil is filled and trained. The DCOP has the ability to
train ALP; on-hand ALP numbers are sufficient to protect key population centers in the district.
Transition to tactical overwatch has had positive results during the reporting period. Of the 46
districts currently in tactical overwatch, all are maintaining local security, logistics are being
managed by the DCOP with the ALP Commander, and pay is distributed either by trusted agent
or electronic methods. However, the longer-term success of the tactical overwatch effort has yet
to be evaluated.
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