Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
The principal strength of the ANA is its proven ability to engage and fight at the kandak
(battalion) level, particular infantry kandaks. Many Afghan soldiers have years of military
experience, and when engaged in combat, ANA kandaks, repeatedly exceeded expectations. 14
The ANA has demonstrated an improving ability to conduct basic coordination and
communication with other elements of the ANSF. The ANA has also demonstrated an emerging
ability to conduct combined arms operations at the Brigade level in cooperation with the ANP
across theatre. However, a lack of trust between the ANSF elements still remains a limiting
factor, although it has improved in some areas. Cross-ANSF command and control capability
will be a focal point for SFAT training in 2013.
A major accomplishment of the ANSF during the reporting period was planning for the 2013
fighting season. Prior to March 2013, coalition forces were largely responsible for the joint
combined planning effort. During the reporting period, the ANSF successfully went through the
entire planning process for the annual and seasonal order. These efforts were not only joint –
incorporating all of the security pillars – but also the plan extended coordination between several
key non-security ministries.
One overarching problem for both the ANA and ANP is their limited capability to generate new
contracts and monitor existing contractors, particularly for logistics support. Building the
resource management and procurement capability needed for continual self-sustainment beyond
December 2014 is challenging and is a top priority for ISAF, which is emphasizing having
skilled SFATs coordinating efforts across the theater to support sustainment and ensure
successful transition.
Intelligence sharing across the ANSF is also problematic. The various components maintain
independent information that they do not share, resulting in limited ability to analyze, verify and
fuse various sources of intelligence to develop targets and drive operations.
Communications in general between the ANA and ANP are still problematic, although this is
highly variable by region. There is no established MOU between the forces requiring the ANP
to engage in fighting that is army-related. This makes cross-service coordination dependent
upon relationships between ANA and ANP commanders. The ANP is working with coalition
advisors to further professionalize its force and gradually shift organizational focus from COIN
operations toward more conventional community policing.
Corruption and criminality in all sectors of Afghan society and government remain the greatest
threats to ANSF development, with narcotics trafficking and criminal patronage networks
(CPNs) likely to become more prominent in the years ahead. Unsatisfactory or criminal
leadership remains a problem in several parts of the MoI as a result of corruption in the
appointment process, lack of effective oversight, and insufficient accountability measures. In
particular, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) is consistently involved in corrupt activities such as
the collection of illicit border revenues, pay-for-position schemes, smuggling and insurgency
collusion.
14 These fluctuations are common in most armed forces, including the U.S. military.
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