Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
Within its mandate to support sub-national administrations, and in keeping with direction under
the Presidential Decree 45, the IDLG announced in January 2013 the merit-based appointment of
70 district and deputy district governors. The overall impact of these new appointees has yet to
be seen, but this is a positive move towards enhancing capacity at the district level, both in terms
of quantity and quality. The IDLG showed further signs of progress recently, including their
establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate to conduct performance assessments
of provincial and district governors, the release of a training guide to assist provinces with
production of Provincial Strategic Plans, and the release of their first annual report assessing
progress on sub-national governance.
A final point of contention is the dispute between President Karzai and the Wolesi Jirga over the
status of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), fuelled by the latter’s desire
to transform the IDLG into a Provincial Affairs Ministry that would be accountable and
answerable to the legislature.
Taliban shadow governance is often seen through a military lens; however, shadow governance
contributes to governmental functions at the local level. All provinces in Afghanistan, with the
exception of Panjshir, have a recognized Taliban shadow governor. While many districts have
established shadow governors as well, the level of influence and control fluctuates significantly.
Most of the shadow governor's responsibilities entail continuing the kinetic fight against the local
ANSF or ISAF elements, but where appropriate they are also responsible for administering
limited governmental functions. These often do not extend beyond taxation and judicial
services. Southern Afghanistan has the most robust shadow governance systems in which
different commissions have been established to separate the civil and military duties. Although
the extent of the shadow governance system varies by province and district, the Taliban are able
to establish some influence over the population through the limited shadow governance functions
they carry out. In some areas, local populations see Taliban governance as less corrupt and
abusive than GIRoA.
Sub-National Governance: Capacity-Building Programs
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) has the lead for provincial
nominations and coordinates district-level nominations with the Independent Administrative
Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). In parallel, the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) has built up a widespread presence at the village and
district level, responding to a different headquarters in Kabul.
The IDLG continues to support development of sub-national government structures in
compliance with National Priority Program for Sub-National Governance (NPP4), and through
policy and planning, capacity development, contract management, and coordination and
facilitation. The directorate faces a number of challenges as it takes this work forward, including
the lack of adequate security in some areas and remote districts, a reduction of donor assistance,
limited and ineffective coordination between donors, implementing partners and ministries, and
the lack of approval of some of the laws and regulations on local governance.
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