Report - United States Department of Defense
Report - United States Department of Defense
Report - United States Department of Defense
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UNCLASSIFIED<br />
to operate as an independent and effective legislative, representative, and oversight body on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> the Afghan people. The international community and NGOs continue to support efforts<br />
aimed at building the technical, legal, and analytical capacity <strong>of</strong> Parliamentary committees.<br />
3.6: FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE BANKING SECTOR<br />
An IMF Board review had originally been anticipated to occur in December 2012, based on end-<br />
September criteria. 34 However, because <strong>of</strong> poor performance by GIRoA, the IMF decided to<br />
defer the December board review and combine it with the third review in spring 2013, based on<br />
end-December criteria. The Afghan Government has not yet completed the measures required to<br />
proceed with the combined review.<br />
Many <strong>of</strong> the IMF benchmarks require the creation <strong>of</strong> a legal and administrative framework <strong>of</strong> a<br />
modern economy and financial system (banking law, anti-money laundering/countering<br />
financing <strong>of</strong> terrorism law, value-added tax law, etc.). The Afghan Government has not fully<br />
embraced these reforms and prioritized their implementation sufficiently to overcome its<br />
capacity constraints. In addition, the Afghan Government’s ambitious plans to increase<br />
domestic revenues have not been entirely successful, meeting only 93 percent <strong>of</strong> its FY2012<br />
revenue target. 35<br />
Resolution <strong>of</strong> the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the Kabul Bank crisis remains an important issue and a test <strong>of</strong> the<br />
government’s willingness and ability to reform. In November 2012, the independent Afghaninternational<br />
community Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) on corruption issued a<br />
report <strong>of</strong> the full range <strong>of</strong> issues on the collapse <strong>of</strong> Kabul Bank, and determined that the bank<br />
was used to run a pyramid investment scheme in a “regulatory vacuum,” diverting savings assets<br />
to personal and business ventures <strong>of</strong> 12 beneficiaries. The report made 48 recommendations,<br />
primarily for government authorities, including the Central Bank, the Attorney General’s Office,<br />
and the Kabul Bank Special Tribunal. Many recommendations were technical in nature and<br />
implementation is underway; other more politically sensitive recommendations are less likely to<br />
be implemented. One recommendation called for criminal investigations <strong>of</strong> all participants and<br />
beneficiaries, and another recommended the expansion <strong>of</strong> Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)<br />
requests by the Attorney General’s Office to track money that has left Afghanistan. The<br />
Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs submitted MLA requests to the <strong>United</strong> Kingdom, <strong>United</strong> Arab<br />
Emirates, India, Switzerland, and France.<br />
Three major tasks remain in the resolution <strong>of</strong> the Kabul Bank scandal: recovery and disposal <strong>of</strong><br />
the remaining assets from ex-shareholders and borrowers; sale or dissolution <strong>of</strong> the remaining<br />
“good bank,” New Kabul Bank; and prosecution <strong>of</strong> those responsible for perpetuating fraud. The<br />
first task, asset recovery, is proceeding slowly, especially for those assets in Afghanistan, even<br />
though the Afghan authorities proclaim that they are confident that they will recover a<br />
respectable amount. However, there have been important recent developments on the other two<br />
tasks. The results <strong>of</strong> the auction <strong>of</strong> New Kabul Bank produced only one bid, which the MoF-led<br />
34 For additional background information on the IMF Extended Credit Facility arrangement with Afghanistan, refer to Financial Reform section<br />
<strong>of</strong> December 2012 <strong>Report</strong> on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.<br />
142