13.01.2015 Views

Report - United States Department of Defense

Report - United States Department of Defense

Report - United States Department of Defense

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

UNCLASSIFIED<br />

to operate as an independent and effective legislative, representative, and oversight body on<br />

behalf <strong>of</strong> the Afghan people. The international community and NGOs continue to support efforts<br />

aimed at building the technical, legal, and analytical capacity <strong>of</strong> Parliamentary committees.<br />

3.6: FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE BANKING SECTOR<br />

An IMF Board review had originally been anticipated to occur in December 2012, based on end-<br />

September criteria. 34 However, because <strong>of</strong> poor performance by GIRoA, the IMF decided to<br />

defer the December board review and combine it with the third review in spring 2013, based on<br />

end-December criteria. The Afghan Government has not yet completed the measures required to<br />

proceed with the combined review.<br />

Many <strong>of</strong> the IMF benchmarks require the creation <strong>of</strong> a legal and administrative framework <strong>of</strong> a<br />

modern economy and financial system (banking law, anti-money laundering/countering<br />

financing <strong>of</strong> terrorism law, value-added tax law, etc.). The Afghan Government has not fully<br />

embraced these reforms and prioritized their implementation sufficiently to overcome its<br />

capacity constraints. In addition, the Afghan Government’s ambitious plans to increase<br />

domestic revenues have not been entirely successful, meeting only 93 percent <strong>of</strong> its FY2012<br />

revenue target. 35<br />

Resolution <strong>of</strong> the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the Kabul Bank crisis remains an important issue and a test <strong>of</strong> the<br />

government’s willingness and ability to reform. In November 2012, the independent Afghaninternational<br />

community Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) on corruption issued a<br />

report <strong>of</strong> the full range <strong>of</strong> issues on the collapse <strong>of</strong> Kabul Bank, and determined that the bank<br />

was used to run a pyramid investment scheme in a “regulatory vacuum,” diverting savings assets<br />

to personal and business ventures <strong>of</strong> 12 beneficiaries. The report made 48 recommendations,<br />

primarily for government authorities, including the Central Bank, the Attorney General’s Office,<br />

and the Kabul Bank Special Tribunal. Many recommendations were technical in nature and<br />

implementation is underway; other more politically sensitive recommendations are less likely to<br />

be implemented. One recommendation called for criminal investigations <strong>of</strong> all participants and<br />

beneficiaries, and another recommended the expansion <strong>of</strong> Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)<br />

requests by the Attorney General’s Office to track money that has left Afghanistan. The<br />

Ministry <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs submitted MLA requests to the <strong>United</strong> Kingdom, <strong>United</strong> Arab<br />

Emirates, India, Switzerland, and France.<br />

Three major tasks remain in the resolution <strong>of</strong> the Kabul Bank scandal: recovery and disposal <strong>of</strong><br />

the remaining assets from ex-shareholders and borrowers; sale or dissolution <strong>of</strong> the remaining<br />

“good bank,” New Kabul Bank; and prosecution <strong>of</strong> those responsible for perpetuating fraud. The<br />

first task, asset recovery, is proceeding slowly, especially for those assets in Afghanistan, even<br />

though the Afghan authorities proclaim that they are confident that they will recover a<br />

respectable amount. However, there have been important recent developments on the other two<br />

tasks. The results <strong>of</strong> the auction <strong>of</strong> New Kabul Bank produced only one bid, which the MoF-led<br />

34 For additional background information on the IMF Extended Credit Facility arrangement with Afghanistan, refer to Financial Reform section<br />

<strong>of</strong> December 2012 <strong>Report</strong> on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.<br />

142

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!