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UNCLASSIFIED Additionally, DABS, has executed all urgent transformer installation upgrades in the Kandahar City distribution system. In July 2012, USACE awarded the contract for replacing and updating the 110 kV line from the Kajaki substation to Durai Junction with Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) funding. The 110 kV line from Durai Junction to Kandahar was awarded in September 2012 under the PTEC. As mentioned above, PTEC will strengthen the NEPS and extend it into the south, to the SEPS. Additionally, USAID’s PTEC project will also focus on significant technical and managerial capacity building activities with DABS, and on commercialization of the utility system. The scopes of work for these activities have been in development in recent months and will be awarded on-budget through DABS in late 2012. DABS has already issued tenders for commercialization and transmission line construction under the PTEC. USAID has received $101M in AIF funding for the first section of the connector from Kabul to Ghazni. USAID will fund the remaining segments with Economic Support Funds (ESF) funds. The Salma Dam in Herat Province has overcome persistent security and contractual issues and work is proceeding, although the dam, a 42-megawatt (MW) power plant and transmission line to Herat, remains significantly behind schedule. The project is not likely to be completed until 2014. Civil Aviation The aviation capability within Afghanistan remains weak, with only limited progress made to date. The Civil Aviation Law passed Parliament in late 2012 and was published in January 2013. This law enables the establishment of a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) as an independent agency reporting through the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA). This ministry has not yet finalized the organizational structure and administrative processes for the establishment of the CAA. Donor nations continue to provide support through the Donor Coordination Board, while aviation-derived revenues are paid directly into the general fund of the Afghan government. Direct international support continues to be provided to Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e- Sharif airfields. Training for aviation services, including air traffic, airfield management, and fire support, is conducted both internally and externally to Afghanistan for Afghan personnel at Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Despite the increased training and capacity of airspace coordination and control, transition of the Civil Aviation System operation and management directly to MoTCA will not be possible by the end of 2014 due to the lack of qualified Afghan personnel. KAIA is currently the only airfield with some qualified Afghan personnel (air traffic control and firefighters), with additional Afghan personnel currently in training. However, by the end of 2014, there will not be enough qualified Afghan personnel available (even at Kabul) to perform necessary airport functions. MoTCA will, in order to provide uninterrupted Civil Aviation System operation, be required to contract for a third party to provide Civil Aviation System operation and management as well as continued training for Afghan personnel in these areas. Airfield transition plans have been developed for Afghanistan’s main airfields of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-E-Sharif. Kabul, however, is currently the only airfield with a fully 165
UNCLASSIFIED endorsed transition plan. Although the transition plans for Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-E-Sharif have been provisionally endorsed by SHAPE, there is currently no resourcing for these plans. An alternate transition plan, which puts the focus on transitioning KAIA first and moves transition for the other airfields in the post-2014 period, has been developed, but not yet endorsed by SHAPE. Although there has been limited progress, the airspace and airfield transitions are not on track for implementation by the end of the ISAF mission. President Karzai signed the Civil Aviation Law, and MoTCA, assisted by the United States and Germany, is moving forward to establish an International Civil Aviation Organization-compliant CAA. With assistance from the U.S. Embassy, MoTCA held a high-level Aviation Donor Coordination Board in March 2013. Additionally, assistance from USCENTCOM Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command will enable MoTCA to issue a contract for the high sector of the Kabul Area Control Center, albeit six months after the required Aviation Action Plan Milestone. It will be years before Afghanistan has the human capital to execute these functions independently beyond Kabul without contractor assistance. Operations and Maintenance Capacity The Afghan government continues to develop the capability and capacity to build significant transportation networks and power infrastructure. However, the ministries responsible for maintaining this infrastructure possess limited ability to adequately execute an O&M plan on the scale required in Afghanistan. The consensus among the international community and coalition military forces is that the number of assets requiring O&M support will exceed Afghan and donor resources that have been included in prospective budgets. ISAF estimates that the Afghan government currently expends approximately $330M annually on O&M, while the World Bank estimates that expenditures up to $1.3B annually will be required to sustain “known” capital investments, including security, resulting in a $1B gap between resources and projected expenditures. During the reporting period, USAID shifted focus, particularly in the transportation sector, to supporting GIRoA to increase O&M capacity. Identification, budgeting, and financing of externally financed assets will be a significant challenge facing transition. Over the past year, various U.S. Embassy, international community, coalition military, and Afghan entities have engaged, on an ad-hoc basis, to address O&M requirements to sustain these assets. Unfortunately, data is insufficient for key stakeholders to even clearly understand the scale of the problem beyond general estimates by various entities, such as the World Bank. Although much of the recent discussion has focused on the additional funding requirements that will be required to support off-budget funded assets as they are transferred to the Afghan government, the current level of O&M funding is inadequate to support even the current assets built on-budget. Even if a comprehensive asset registry could be obtained quickly and adequate funds were made available for O&M, the Afghan government’s nascent budgetary capacity would still be a significant limitation to successful O&M execution. A World Bank study assesses that the limitations in internal technical capacity, including contracting and procurement to seek outside assistance, would inhibit the effectiveness of any increase in O&M budget disbursed through the 166
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Report on Progress Toward Security
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................
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ANSF Self-assessment ..............
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UNCLASSIFIED Executive Summary 1 Th
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UNCLASSIFIED coordination among the
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UNCLASSIFIED further the Afghan-led
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UNCLASSIFIED the World Bank, and ab
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UNCLASSIFIED but ISAF mistakenly di
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 3 illustrates t
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UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 1 - SECURITY 1
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UNCLASSIFIED ISAF has identified re
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UNCLASSIFIED 1.4: NATO-ISAF FORCE L
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 2: EIAs Share b
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UNCLASSIFIED Ceasefires can have ne
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 3: Nationwide S
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UNCLASSIFIED Belambai. The Panjwa
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UNCLASSIFIED security operations ha
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UNCLASSIFIED and become capable of
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UNCLASSIFIED to the province. GIRoA
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UNCLASSIFIED 1.8: INSIDER THREAT 8
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UNCLASSIFIED conduct an attack. Ins
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UNCLASSIFIED The numbers of attacks
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UNCLASSIFIED PPCs are responsible f
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UNCLASSIFIED formal procedure for m
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UNCLASSIFIED APRP funding provided
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 9: Perceptions
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UNCLASSIFIED challenge for Afghans
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 10: ANSF and IS
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UNCLASSIFIED Renewed effort and att
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UNCLASSIFIED centralized “Soviet
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UNCLASSIFIED CM-1A CM-1B CM-2A CM-2
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UNCLASSIFIED Patang made significan
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UNCLASSIFIED Also of note this repo
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UNCLASSIFIED areas to continue the
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 17: AAF End Str
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UNCLASSIFIED assigned outside of th
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 20: ANASOF Oper
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UNCLASSIFIED ANASOF currently opera
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 21: ANSF Enable
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 22: ANA Logisti
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UNCLASSIFIED reaching the original
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UNCLASSIFIED Corruption and infiltr
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UNCLASSIFIED operations is the weak
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UNCLASSIFIED The International Poli
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UNCLASSIFIED smaller regional nodes
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UNCLASSIFIED The still-nascent ANP
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UNCLASSIFIED are the development of
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UNCLASSIFIED 2.8: AFGHAN PUBLIC PRO
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UNCLASSIFIED APPF Tasks and Mission
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UNCLASSIFIED APPF Support Criteria
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UNCLASSIFIED CM Definitions CM1 CM2
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UNCLASSIFIED governance and develop
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UNCLASSIFIED However, the shift fro
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UNCLASSIFIED Non-ALP Local Defense
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UNCLASSIFIED Continued ISAF support
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UNCLASSIFIED increasingly unsuitabl
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UNCLASSIFIED Both forces continued
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UNCLASSIFIED Category Metric How it
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UNCLASSIFIED At the NATO summit in
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 33: ANSF Constr
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Page 124 and 125: UNCLASSIFIED Despite the complex cu
Page 126 and 127: UNCLASSIFIED exchanging current pro
Page 128 and 129: UNCLASSIFIED In addition to the man
Page 130 and 131: UNCLASSIFIED prevent well-intention
Page 132 and 133: UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 3 - GOVERNANCE
Page 134 and 135: UNCLASSIFIED related tasks in suppo
Page 136 and 137: UNCLASSIFIED Within its mandate to
Page 138 and 139: UNCLASSIFIED to be exclusively run
Page 140 and 141: UNCLASSIFIED Customs revenues on cr
Page 142 and 143: UNCLASSIFIED 32 Presently NROLFSM-A
Page 144 and 145: UNCLASSIFIED The Afghan judicial sy
Page 146 and 147: UNCLASSIFIED However, there are are
Page 148 and 149: UNCLASSIFIED Since the first post-2
Page 150 and 151: UNCLASSIFIED review committee rejec
Page 152 and 153: UNCLASSIFIED the key points being t
Page 154 and 155: UNCLASSIFIED Enforcement Administra
Page 156 and 157: UNCLASSIFIED The CNP-A is the ANP c
Page 158 and 159: UNCLASSIFIED Afghanistan Threat Fin
Page 160 and 161: UNCLASSIFIED force; laying a founda
Page 162 and 163: UNCLASSIFIED pomegranates to 50 pro
Page 164 and 165: UNCLASSIFIED Continued USDA capacit
Page 166 and 167: UNCLASSIFIED Afghanistan’s effort
Page 168 and 169: UNCLASSIFIED Recent developments in
Page 170 and 171: UNCLASSIFIED For the East-West corr
Page 174 and 175: UNCLASSIFIED Afghan Government. Cur
Page 176 and 177: UNCLASSIFIED million condoms and or
Page 178 and 179: UNCLASSIFIED The main U.S. Embassy
Page 180 and 181: UNCLASSIFIED GAs are full-time posi
Page 182 and 183: Percentage UNCLASSIFIED 60% Female
Page 184 and 185: UNCLASSIFIED India supports a varie
Page 186 and 187: UNCLASSIFIED this reporting period.
Page 188 and 189: UNCLASSIFIED major source of remitt
Page 190 and 191: UNCLASSIFIED A.1: MONTHLY SECURITY
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