Report - United States Department of Defense

More documents

Recommendations

Info

UNCLASSIFIED Non-ALP Local Defense Forces Until recently, three main Local Defense Forces (LDFs) were supported by ISAF: (1) Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS) – aligned to RC-E; (2) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) – aligned to RC-N; and (3) Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) – aligned to RC-S and RC-SW. On December 25, 2011, President Karzai called for the disestablishment of all non-GIRoA-sanctioned LDF. All CIP and CBSS have been demobilized as of November 2012. ISCI had not been demobilized as of March 31, 2013. NSOCC-A is working to assist RC-SW in the demobilization process through the ALP program. Indeed, in some cases, NSOCC-A provides ALP applications to recently demobilized LDF. This transition option is done with the express requirement that those demobilizing meet “all the same criteria” of any other ALP candidate and do not simply “crosswalk” from LDF to ALP. This initiative is addressing ALP development requirements while maintaining sizeable numbers of former LDF employed under a legitimate GIRoA endorsed program. ALP Way Ahead In recognition of the success of the ALP program and the need to extend its reach into new areas, ISAF has begun to transition the primary supervisory responsibility for established ALP sites to the ANSF, with U.S. forces moving into tactical overwatch roles in 46 district locations (as of March 31, 2013) and 74 districts by July 2013. The sustainability and success of these districts, however, ultimately depends on GIRoA taking increased ownership and responsibility. In order for a district to transition to tactical overwatch, it must meet the following criteria: (1) Leadership: The DCOP and ALP Commanders are appointed and in place, and the DCOP and ALP Commanders are competent and support each other; (2) Legitimacy: Shura leaders are identified and validated. Seventy percent of the ALP across the district are approved by a shura and are from the local area. Shura leaders are capable of maintaining the ALP program. The local populace views the ALP as legitimate; (3) Logistics: 70 percent of on-hand ALP in districts are regularly receiving MoI pay and have sufficient weapons, fuel, and ammunition to perform duties. GIRoA district leadership provides adequate sustainment for ALP across the district; (4) Security: Each ALP village/element has an identified ANSF support force that can reinforce all ALP locations. The DCOP is capable of coordinating security actions across the district in support of ALP; (5) Manning: 70 percent of the district tashkil is filled and trained. The DCOP has the ability to train ALP; on-hand ALP numbers are sufficient to protect key population centers in the district. Transition to tactical overwatch has had positive results during the reporting period. Of the 46 districts currently in tactical overwatch, all are maintaining local security, logistics are being managed by the DCOP with the ALP Commander, and pay is distributed either by trusted agent or electronic methods. However, the longer-term success of the tactical overwatch effort has yet to be evaluated. 101
UNCLASSIFIED 2.10: ANSF COUNTER-IED CAPABILITIES The leading cause of injury and fatalities for coalition personnel, ANSF, and Afghan civilians continues to be IEDs, with more than 2,500 civilian casualties caused by IEDs and more than 4,100 ANSF casualties caused by IEDs in 2012. A significant gap remains in fielding the required number of Afghan C-IED units: as of February 2013, ANA had 59 validated Explosive Ordinance Device (EOD) teams out of an authorized 230 and ANP has 14 validated teams out of an authorized 88. ANSF’s C-IED efforts continue to make steady progress, with fielded units in many ways exceeding the expectations of ISAF partners. However, IEDs are a major factor in the rise in ANSF casualties seen during the reporting period. All 24 Afghan National Army (ANA) RCCs are currently fielded and operating. While conducting daily route clearance missions, they can effectively find and clear with internal enablers such as validated EOD teams or explosive hazard reduction teams. Currently, 20 RCCs are operating independently with advisors, and three others are effective with partners. ANSF EOD and RCCs have been locating the majority of the IEDs for several months. These units are not reliant on high-end detection technologies. The ANSF “found and cleared” rates are comparable to, and often slightly better than, coalition rates. Not unexpectedly, Afghan personnel often use tips from the local population and local familiarity more effectively than coalition forces. Afghan C-IED units have in some cases demonstrated an impressive level of capability considering their lack of sophisticated equipment. However, Afghan units, partially as a result of their lack of equipment, also face a higher level of risk in disposing of IEDs, and are not as effective as their ISAF counterparts. In urban areas, ANP often perform IED defeat (IEDD) operations to the same level of proficiency as their ISAF counterparts; Afghan personnel understand and employ basic IEDD logic, skills, and low-technology tools and equipment to great effect. Only one national crime lab is operational; it is located in Kabul. With assistance from ISAF, the lab will receive an interim upgrade prior to being relocated to a new facility in mid-2014. The second national lab in Herat is in the contracting phase and progressing towards Full Operating Capability (FOC) by mid-2014. Significant challenges still exist for generating fully manned, trained, and equipped C-IED teams. ANSF face a range of challenges, specifically in the areas of training through-put and EOD retention. The GIRoA logistics chain also regularly fails to provide proper electronic counter-measures (ECM), and coalition-funded equipment often remains in local depots or unit supply rooms, forcing ANP (and ANA) C-IED teams to assume exceptional risk to remove or mitigate IEDs. ANSF reporting of report IED events is very inconsistent. 102
Page 2 and 3:
Report on Progress Toward Security
Page 4 and 5:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................
Page 6 and 7:
ANSF Self-assessment ..............
Page 8 and 9:
UNCLASSIFIED Executive Summary 1 Th
Page 10 and 11:
UNCLASSIFIED coordination among the
Page 12 and 13:
UNCLASSIFIED further the Afghan-led
Page 14 and 15:
UNCLASSIFIED the World Bank, and ab
Page 16 and 17:
UNCLASSIFIED but ISAF mistakenly di
Page 18 and 19:
UNCLASSIFIED Figure 3 illustrates t
Page 20 and 21:
UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 1 - SECURITY 1
Page 22 and 23:
UNCLASSIFIED ISAF has identified re
Page 24 and 25:
UNCLASSIFIED 1.4: NATO-ISAF FORCE L
Page 26 and 27:
UNCLASSIFIED Figure 2: EIAs Share b
Page 28 and 29:
UNCLASSIFIED Ceasefires can have ne
Page 30 and 31:
UNCLASSIFIED Figure 3: Nationwide S
Page 32 and 33:
UNCLASSIFIED Belambai. The Panjwa
Page 34 and 35:
UNCLASSIFIED security operations ha
Page 36 and 37:
UNCLASSIFIED and become capable of
Page 38 and 39:
UNCLASSIFIED to the province. GIRoA
Page 40 and 41:
UNCLASSIFIED 1.8: INSIDER THREAT 8
Page 42 and 43:
UNCLASSIFIED conduct an attack. Ins
Page 44 and 45:
UNCLASSIFIED The numbers of attacks
Page 46 and 47:
UNCLASSIFIED PPCs are responsible f
Page 48 and 49:
UNCLASSIFIED formal procedure for m
Page 50 and 51:
UNCLASSIFIED APRP funding provided
Page 52 and 53:
UNCLASSIFIED Figure 9: Perceptions
Page 54 and 55:
UNCLASSIFIED challenge for Afghans
Page 56 and 57:
UNCLASSIFIED Figure 10: ANSF and IS
Page 58 and 59: UNCLASSIFIED Renewed effort and att
Page 60 and 61: UNCLASSIFIED centralized “Soviet
Page 62 and 63: UNCLASSIFIED CM-1A CM-1B CM-2A CM-2
Page 64 and 65: UNCLASSIFIED Patang made significan
Page 66 and 67: UNCLASSIFIED Also of note this repo
Page 68 and 69: UNCLASSIFIED areas to continue the
Page 70 and 71: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 17: AAF End Str
Page 72 and 73: UNCLASSIFIED assigned outside of th
Page 74 and 75: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 20: ANASOF Oper
Page 76 and 77: UNCLASSIFIED ANASOF currently opera
Page 78 and 79: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 21: ANSF Enable
Page 80 and 81: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 22: ANA Logisti
Page 82 and 83: UNCLASSIFIED reaching the original
Page 84 and 85: UNCLASSIFIED Corruption and infiltr
Page 86 and 87: UNCLASSIFIED operations is the weak
Page 88 and 89: UNCLASSIFIED The International Poli
Page 90 and 91: UNCLASSIFIED smaller regional nodes
Page 92 and 93: UNCLASSIFIED The still-nascent ANP
Page 94 and 95: UNCLASSIFIED are the development of
Page 96 and 97: UNCLASSIFIED 2.8: AFGHAN PUBLIC PRO
Page 98 and 99: UNCLASSIFIED APPF Tasks and Mission
Page 100 and 101: UNCLASSIFIED APPF Support Criteria
Page 102 and 103: UNCLASSIFIED CM Definitions CM1 CM2
Page 104 and 105: UNCLASSIFIED governance and develop
Page 106 and 107: UNCLASSIFIED However, the shift fro
Page 110 and 111: UNCLASSIFIED Continued ISAF support
Page 112 and 113: UNCLASSIFIED increasingly unsuitabl
Page 114 and 115: UNCLASSIFIED Both forces continued
Page 116 and 117: UNCLASSIFIED Category Metric How it
Page 118 and 119: UNCLASSIFIED At the NATO summit in
Page 120 and 121: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 33: ANSF Constr
Page 122 and 123: UNCLASSIFIED late in the planning p
Page 124 and 125: UNCLASSIFIED Despite the complex cu
Page 126 and 127: UNCLASSIFIED exchanging current pro
Page 128 and 129: UNCLASSIFIED In addition to the man
Page 130 and 131: UNCLASSIFIED prevent well-intention
Page 132 and 133: UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 3 - GOVERNANCE
Page 134 and 135: UNCLASSIFIED related tasks in suppo
Page 136 and 137: UNCLASSIFIED Within its mandate to
Page 138 and 139: UNCLASSIFIED to be exclusively run
Page 140 and 141: UNCLASSIFIED Customs revenues on cr
Page 142 and 143: UNCLASSIFIED 32 Presently NROLFSM-A
Page 144 and 145: UNCLASSIFIED The Afghan judicial sy
Page 146 and 147: UNCLASSIFIED However, there are are
Page 148 and 149: UNCLASSIFIED Since the first post-2
Page 150 and 151: UNCLASSIFIED review committee rejec
Page 152 and 153: UNCLASSIFIED the key points being t
Page 154 and 155: UNCLASSIFIED Enforcement Administra
Page 156 and 157: UNCLASSIFIED The CNP-A is the ANP c
Page 158 and 159:
UNCLASSIFIED Afghanistan Threat Fin
Page 160 and 161:
UNCLASSIFIED force; laying a founda
Page 162 and 163:
UNCLASSIFIED pomegranates to 50 pro
Page 164 and 165:
UNCLASSIFIED Continued USDA capacit
Page 166 and 167:
UNCLASSIFIED Afghanistan’s effort
Page 168 and 169:
UNCLASSIFIED Recent developments in
Page 170 and 171:
UNCLASSIFIED For the East-West corr
Page 172 and 173:
UNCLASSIFIED Additionally, DABS, ha
Page 174 and 175:
UNCLASSIFIED Afghan Government. Cur
Page 176 and 177:
UNCLASSIFIED million condoms and or
Page 178 and 179:
UNCLASSIFIED The main U.S. Embassy
Page 180 and 181:
UNCLASSIFIED GAs are full-time posi
Page 182 and 183:
Percentage UNCLASSIFIED 60% Female
Page 184 and 185:
UNCLASSIFIED India supports a varie
Page 186 and 187:
UNCLASSIFIED this reporting period.
Page 188 and 189:
UNCLASSIFIED major source of remitt
Page 190 and 191:
UNCLASSIFIED A.1: MONTHLY SECURITY
show all

Report - United States Department of Defense

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?