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Report - United States Department of Defense

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UNCLASSIFIED<br />

Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other U.S. government <strong>Department</strong>s and Agencies to<br />

support the overall CN strategy for Afghanistan.<br />

The main goal <strong>of</strong> ISAF’s CN strategy is to reduce the ability <strong>of</strong> the insurgency to draw support<br />

from the narcotics industry. RC-S and RC-SW remained priority areas for military and law<br />

enforcement CN efforts during the reporting period. These regions constitute principal areas for<br />

Afghan poppy cultivation, and as such, are major sources <strong>of</strong> revenue for the Taliban-led<br />

insurgency. DoD’s role in supporting CN operations includes building the capacity <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Counternarcotics Police <strong>of</strong> Afghanistan (CNP-A), improving border security, promoting<br />

information sharing, and fostering regional and international cooperation.<br />

Despite this high operational tempo and a number <strong>of</strong> large seizures and high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile arrests<br />

during the reporting period, overall coalition and ANSF CN interdiction efforts have had a small<br />

but not insignificant effect on overall insurgent pr<strong>of</strong>its from narcotics. However, the narcotics<br />

market in Afghanistan is large, and insurgent penetration <strong>of</strong> that market is extensive and<br />

expanding. CN interdiction operations in one area can be supplanted by the insurgents<br />

increasing pr<strong>of</strong>its in other areas, such as donations and kidnapping for ransom.<br />

CN interdiction operations, in addition to crop substitution, subsidies to farmers, targeted arrests,<br />

the disruption <strong>of</strong> narcotics trafficking networks, and increased CN-focused rule <strong>of</strong> law together<br />

have the potential to reduce significantly insurgent financing from narcotics. However, none <strong>of</strong><br />

these efforts individually will be able to have a major effect. The political will <strong>of</strong> the Afghan<br />

government and the transition <strong>of</strong> security to Afghan forces remain the greatest challenges to<br />

implementing this comprehensive CN program.<br />

The <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> published a new CN Strategy for Afghanistan in January 2013. This revision<br />

prioritizes CN assistance during the security transition and drawdown <strong>of</strong> U.S. and coalition<br />

combat forces. ISAF continues to assist the Afghan Government in developing its<br />

counternarcotics capacity and capability for the eventual transition to greater Afghan<br />

responsibility.<br />

Although the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Judicial Center (CNJC) continues to perform admirably,<br />

further progress is needed to reduce corruption in the justice sector and in state functions<br />

important to transition such as border checkpoints, airports, and inland customs depots.<br />

Nonetheless, U.S. Border Management Task Force-trained Afghan customs <strong>of</strong>ficials are making<br />

significant progress in airport security at KAIA.<br />

Counternarcotics Operations<br />

The DEA, the CNP-A National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and ISAF maintained a high CN<br />

operational tempo throughout the reporting period, conducting several major increasingly<br />

Afghan-led CN operations. ISAF targeting <strong>of</strong> high-value individuals and their support zones<br />

applied pressure on the networks and caused temporary dislocations; however, with their ability<br />

to quickly adapt new tactics, the narcotics networks are likely to continue to function. The<br />

concentration <strong>of</strong> raids was in northern Helmand and Nimroz; vehicle interdictions were focused<br />

in central and southern Helmand and along the RC-SW/RC-W boundary in northern Nimroz. A<br />

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