Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
majority of operations were successful, but networks remain resilient. Disruptions to these
networks are the result of capital losses, including drug processing equipment and drug seizures.
Occasionally, after strong evidentiary cases have been established, high-value drug traffickers
supporting the insurgency are arrested and sentenced. A recent example of this is the arrest and
conviction of Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai, a U.S. Treasury-designated “kingpin.” Haji Lal Jan was
subsequently prosecuted at the CNJC and received a 20 year sentence. His case is currently
under appeal.
CN operations during the reporting period were facilitated by the continued progress of the
DEA-mentored Judicial Wire Intercept Program (JWIP). During this reporting period,
information obtained through the JWIP resulted in the arrest of 33 individuals and the seizure of
104 kilograms of heroin.
Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) is a GIRoA program funded by the DOS Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. ISAF has only a limited role in supporting and
helping to coordinate the GLE program. Following the 2012 GLE campaign, which eradicated
9,672 hectares of poppies, the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) began planning and
coordinating the 2013 GLE Campaign, with a nationwide goal of eradicating 15,000 hectares.
The GLE campaign is ongoing as of the end of the reporting period, with eradication underway
in six provinces. Preliminary verification as of April 1, 2013 indicates that 2,721 hectares of
eradication have taken place. Currently-verified amounts may be revised downward in the
process of secondary verification.
Preliminary reports indicate that there has been reluctance on the part of ANSF leadership to
participate fully in the GLE effort this year, although as of April 1, some 26 ANP and 3 ANA
had lost their lives in connection with eradication efforts during the 2013 cycle.
The GLE program has yet to prove its utility in decreasing insurgent funding, and could in fact
increase it in certain areas. Although increased eradication deters some farmers from planting
poppy by increasing the involved risk, this often results in the shifting of cultivation to outside
the GLE areas. GLE is usually conducted in areas of GIRoA control, and does not concentrate
on areas of insurgent control, which are often in more remote regions. GLE is not exclusively
aimed at nor does it significantly affect insurgent funding. Indeed, GLE may actually push some
opium farmers away from GIRoA-controlled areas and into more remote areas under insurgent
influence. Furthermore, corrupt application of the program often results in only the fields that do
not pay bribes being eradicated. The Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics believes GLE is
most effective when paired with an Alternative Livelihood (AL) campaign designed to give
subsistence farmers a viable alternatives to growing poppy. Evidence from the Helmand Food
Zone Program and elsewhere suggests targeted AL, in combination with GLE, is more likely to
result in sustainable conversion from poppy to licit cultivation. Overall, it is not clear whether
GLE by itself, or even coupled with an AL campaign, has a positive or negative effect on the
coalition’s goal of reducing insurgent funding.
Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units
148