Report - United States Department of Defense
Report - United States Department of Defense
Report - United States Department of Defense
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UNCLASSIFIED<br />
which Afghanistan is a party. However, ROLFF-A continues to support USAID programs<br />
continue to work with the informal justice system, primarily linking it to the formal governance<br />
processes. These improvements bear fruit one community at a time by helping improve the<br />
decision-making <strong>of</strong> traditional dispute-resolution councils (shuras) through training on Afghan<br />
and human rights law, particularly as it relates to women’s rights.<br />
Targeted assassinations <strong>of</strong> justice sector personnel, general threats, and the lack <strong>of</strong> personal<br />
security while traveling or in courthouses remain persistent problems that GIRoA refuses to<br />
address systemically. Except for the U.S. Marshal’s Service-supported Judicial Security Unit,<br />
which only operates in Kabul and Parwan, protection <strong>of</strong> justice sector personnel is largely<br />
dependent upon transient local solutions. The transient solutions also illustrate the lack <strong>of</strong><br />
cooperation between different justice sector personnel; with coaxing and mentoring, these actors<br />
sometimes work together, but truly cooperative efforts to achieve justice appear to be the<br />
exception, not the rule.<br />
Lack <strong>of</strong> progress on mining, land, local governance, access to information, and anti-corruption<br />
legislation continued to impair economic development in Afghanistan. In fact, no draft laws tied<br />
to the 2010 Kabul Conference commitments were sent to the National Assembly. The<br />
administration collected public comments on draft amendments to the Electoral Law and Land<br />
Management Law, and it is drafting a new Local Governance Law. Differences between the<br />
administration and the National Assembly may be slowing down consensus building. Those<br />
differences led to the President’s veto <strong>of</strong> amendments to the law on organizing the courts. When<br />
the government moves slowly to enable change, when governance and rule <strong>of</strong> law fail to support<br />
development, and when the government unevenly provides basic legal services, the trust <strong>of</strong><br />
Afghans in their government diminishes, thereby impairing transition. The Afghan Senior<br />
Leader Protection (ASLP) program has a provision for the protection <strong>of</strong> judges, and a tashkil has<br />
been approved; unfortunately, the MoI has made no movement for selection and training <strong>of</strong><br />
protection personnel.<br />
The Taliban justice system is arguably the most effective way the Taliban are able to maintain<br />
influence, especially in rural areas, and regions where GIRoA justice systems are lacking or<br />
corrupt. In these areas, Taliban justice is <strong>of</strong>ten considered timelier, more impartial, and less<br />
corrupt then the GIRoA justice system. In some cases, the local populace will also seek out<br />
Taliban justices, even if GIRoA justices are available, because the Taliban system is more<br />
consistent with rural traditions. While Taliban justice systems are most prominent in areas <strong>of</strong><br />
southern and eastern Afghanistan, these systems represent a residual, competing Taliban<br />
influence among the populace that undermines GIRoA's credibility.<br />
The Justice Sector<br />
Overall, RoL progress continues to be mixed. Although difficult to determine whether there is<br />
greater support for the justice sector, the December 2012 Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly<br />
Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey data results indicate an increased popular willingness to<br />
refer disputes to Afghan justice <strong>of</strong>ficials for resolution.<br />
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