Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
Counter-corruption within MoD remains a key concern, and counter-corruption efforts remain
nascent. Poor manning of MoD advisor counter-corruption efforts, limited authorities and focus
on the effort from ISAF, and numerous frictions within MoD preclude scoping the problem
accurately at this time. Few cases are reported and tracked at the MoD and GS level, primarily
due to the lack of anonymity in reporting, fear of reprisal against “whistle blowers,” widespread
belief that the investigative arms of MoD are themselves heavily corrupted, and unnecessarily
restrictive language in investigative process regulations preventing or greatly slowing any
investigation. MoD advisors lack the personnel authorities to oversee and assist the MoD
investigative process properly. Minister of Defense Mohammadi appears to want to take
decisive action to understand the scope and methods of corruption in MoD, and apply the
necessary countermeasures.
Assessment of the Ministry of Interior
Relative to the last reporting period, the MoI has progressed significantly. Although still short of
its fielded force generation goal of 157,000 personnel, efforts to professionalize the force have
led to improvements in capability milestones (CM). The most recent monthly ISAF Ministerial
Development Board (MDB) voted in December 2012 to assess the overall MoI development
status at CM-2B, meaning that ministries are capable of accomplishing their mission but require
some coalition assistance.
Noteworthy trends include a doubling of the ministries at CM-1B or greater from two to four
(Public Affairs, Legal Advisor, Policy Development, and ANCOP (all pending NTM-A/CSTC-A
Command approval)), the reduction of units at CM-4 from two to zero, and the addition of a new
agency to the MDB, the Afghan National Fire and Disaster Response Emergency Services
Agency. Of the 32 MoI pillars, almost three-fourths (72 percent) are at CM-2B or better. There
are 19 units at the CM-2 level (CM2A=9; CM2B=10). Of these, all but two (Inspector General
and Afghan Local Police (ALP)) are projected to be at CM-1B or higher in 2013, with the other
two trailing in 2014.
Viewed from either a security or support perspective, the strength of MoI lies in its major
security pillars. Shortfalls, however, exist in the support pillars buttressing these security
elements. The five primary support areas at the CM-3 level are Gender Affairs; Logistics;
Facilities; Information Technology; and Counter-IED. Trends in these areas have not changed
significantly from the last reporting period. Associated challenges include reluctance of MoI
provincial leadership to place female hiring as top priority; inadequate numbers of trained
logisticians; inability of the Facilities Department to fill more tashkil positions; lack of
Information Technology personnel to support program expansion of electronic solutions; and
Counter-IED’s lack of trained teams.
Since the appointment of Minister Patang in September 2012, the MoI has made significant steps
to empower ministerial leadership and professionalize MoI’s internal security force. Patang’s
efforts resulted in measurable progress, including merit-based promotions, overhauling the ANP
tashkil and structure, standing up community policing units, improving police training and the
prison system, making timely preparations for the 2014 elections, and properly equipping the
ABP.
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