Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
Renewed effort and attention, specifically in the ANSF recruiting process, is required to further
reduce corruption in the security forces. Corruption and a lack of accountability in the
recruitment process have resulted in the acceptance of recruits who should have been rejected on
mental health or moral grounds. Reacting to the growing number of insider attacks, the Afghan
government has begun to address defects in the ANSF recruiting process, though challenges still
remain.
2.2: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE
As the ANA develops, the main focus of SFA efforts shifts from the kandak level to the brigade
level to the corps level to the region level. At SFA Level 1, the coalition unit continually advises
and assists an ANSF unit on a daily basis, either from an embedded footprint or in close
proximity. This model can also apply to partnering. SFATs that provide Level 1 contact will be
supporting only one ANSF unit. Level 2 SFA refers to when a coalition unit advises and assists
on a less frequent basis (determined by Commanders) to ensure the continued development of
the ANSF units. The frequency of this interaction varies depending on the proximity to the
ANSF unit, the capability of the ANSF unit, threat, coalition resources and operational
reach. SFATs that provide Level 2 contact may be supporting more than one ANSF unit. Level
2 methodology will become the acceptable approach as ANA kandak (and later brigades) are
assessed as “independent with advisors” and ready to assume the lead and full authority in their
areas of responsibility.
As of the end of the reporting period there was a shortfall of 60 SFATs, forcing ISAF to
prioritize assigning the teams to certain key ANSF units. There are three major factors that
impact the SFA coverage prioritization: threat to the ANSF and their ability to manage the
violence and contain insurgency in their particular geographic area; the ability of ISAF to
provide force protection and MEDEVAC in the area; and the development level of the ANSF
itself. Due to lower threat and the dispersion of the ANSF units, there are more ANSF units in
RC-N and RC-W operating autonomously than in RC-S, RC-E, and RC-SW. As ISAF continues
to draw down SFAT coverage, there will be fewer than 200 SFA requirements by the end of
2013.
The decision to provide SFA at different levels is a fluid process that is dependent on several
factors. In several locations throughout Afghanistan, particularly in the north and west, SFA
coverage has already shifted above the Brigade and Province level. Still, progress in some units
lags due to threat level, fielding schedules, and other factors. Because of the fluidity and variance
of development among Afghan units, the decision to transition SFA levels is often made at the
regional command level and is a function of four major criteria:
- Capability of ANSF units, as described by the readiness definition levels in the
commander’s unit assessment tool (CUAT);
- Threat/security assessment of the provinces and districts in the area;
- Impact on campaign success (areas identified as key terrain districts); and
- The stage of transition in the area.
These data are collected and reviewed quarterly by the ISAF Joint Command Staff to ensure that
milestones are being met and that development is progressing as desired. ISAF’s objective is to
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