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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 10: ANSF and ISAF Operations Operational Category Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12 Jan-13 Feb-13 Mar-13 ISAF Unilateral Military Ops 1,852 ISAF Unilateral Police Ops 0 ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total) 1,435 1,124 1,252 1,320 1,848 1,852 ANA Unilateral 18,768 ANP Unilateral 11,966 ANSF Led Unilateral (Total) 5,345 3,579 20,513 31,247 24,140 30,734 ISAF Led Combined (ANA) 316 ISAF Led Combined (ANP) 0 ISAF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total) 1,962 1,537 1,676 1,814 2,282 316 ANA Led Combined 956 ANA Led Enabled 332 ANA Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total) 410 400 1,291 1,871 1,594 1,288 ANP Led Combined 0 ANP Led Enabled 183 ANP Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total) 183 ANSF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total) 410 400 1,291 1,871 1,594 1,471 Total Ops 9,152 6,640 24,732 36,252 29,864 34,373 Total ISAF Led Ops 3,397 2,661 2,928 3,134 4,130 2,168 Total ANSF Led Ops 5,755 3,979 21,804 33,118 25,734 32,205 % of Total Ops that are ISAF Led 37% 40% 12% 9% 14% 6% % of Total Ops that are ANSF Led 63% 60% 88% 91% 86% 94% Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12 Jan-13 Feb-13 Mar-13 Operation levels include Routine, Platoon/Toley, Kandak, and Above Kandak. Reference: IJC "ANSF in the Lead OPREP Roll-up," April 2013. Color scheme: Coalition is blue, ANP & ANA is green, combined is purple, and orange is summary statistics. Note 1: In December 2012 IJC issued a FRAGO requiring all forces to report more categories of operations; see rise in total ops in DEC 2012. Note 2: In March 2013 IJC began publishing these new operational permutations with greater specificity, e.g., ANA and ANP operations could be unliateral, enabled, or combined, and be either ANA/ANP led or ISAF led. GIRoA and ISAF made a deliberate decision several years ago to focus on the rapid growth of the ANSF (force size), followed by the development of enablers and professionalization of the ranks. This decision was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built to size, would need to develop logistics, personnel management, and leadership skills, among others. As such, the ANSF continues to require ISAF close air support, and airlift, logistics, medical and ISR support. The lack of these enablers prevents many ANSF units from reaching the highest capability rating. NTM-A’s emphasis for 2013 will be on measured growth, shaping both rank structure and skill sets to develop a capable and sustainable force. Most of the new units being fielded are now specialty units, such as counter-IED teams, which require more qualified recruits. NTM-A will not complete fielding of all organizational units until the end of 2013, and the AAF will not be fully fielded or mission capable until 2017. Once at full operational capability, the endstrength of both forces will be slightly below the total ceiling of 352,000 personnel. This will allow for natural fluctuations in attrition, recruiting and retention. 13 13 These fluctuations are common in most armed forces, including the U.S. military. 49
UNCLASSIFIED The principal strength of the ANA is its proven ability to engage and fight at the kandak (battalion) level, particular infantry kandaks. Many Afghan soldiers have years of military experience, and when engaged in combat, ANA kandaks, repeatedly exceeded expectations. 14 The ANA has demonstrated an improving ability to conduct basic coordination and communication with other elements of the ANSF. The ANA has also demonstrated an emerging ability to conduct combined arms operations at the Brigade level in cooperation with the ANP across theatre. However, a lack of trust between the ANSF elements still remains a limiting factor, although it has improved in some areas. Cross-ANSF command and control capability will be a focal point for SFAT training in 2013. A major accomplishment of the ANSF during the reporting period was planning for the 2013 fighting season. Prior to March 2013, coalition forces were largely responsible for the joint combined planning effort. During the reporting period, the ANSF successfully went through the entire planning process for the annual and seasonal order. These efforts were not only joint – incorporating all of the security pillars – but also the plan extended coordination between several key non-security ministries. One overarching problem for both the ANA and ANP is their limited capability to generate new contracts and monitor existing contractors, particularly for logistics support. Building the resource management and procurement capability needed for continual self-sustainment beyond December 2014 is challenging and is a top priority for ISAF, which is emphasizing having skilled SFATs coordinating efforts across the theater to support sustainment and ensure successful transition. Intelligence sharing across the ANSF is also problematic. The various components maintain independent information that they do not share, resulting in limited ability to analyze, verify and fuse various sources of intelligence to develop targets and drive operations. Communications in general between the ANA and ANP are still problematic, although this is highly variable by region. There is no established MOU between the forces requiring the ANP to engage in fighting that is army-related. This makes cross-service coordination dependent upon relationships between ANA and ANP commanders. The ANP is working with coalition advisors to further professionalize its force and gradually shift organizational focus from COIN operations toward more conventional community policing. Corruption and criminality in all sectors of Afghan society and government remain the greatest threats to ANSF development, with narcotics trafficking and criminal patronage networks (CPNs) likely to become more prominent in the years ahead. Unsatisfactory or criminal leadership remains a problem in several parts of the MoI as a result of corruption in the appointment process, lack of effective oversight, and insufficient accountability measures. In particular, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) is consistently involved in corrupt activities such as the collection of illicit border revenues, pay-for-position schemes, smuggling and insurgency collusion. 14 These fluctuations are common in most armed forces, including the U.S. military. 50
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Report on Progress Toward Security
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................
Page 6 and 7: ANSF Self-assessment ..............
Page 8 and 9: UNCLASSIFIED Executive Summary 1 Th
Page 10 and 11: UNCLASSIFIED coordination among the
Page 12 and 13: UNCLASSIFIED further the Afghan-led
Page 14 and 15: UNCLASSIFIED the World Bank, and ab
Page 16 and 17: UNCLASSIFIED but ISAF mistakenly di
Page 18 and 19: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 3 illustrates t
Page 20 and 21: UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 1 - SECURITY 1
Page 22 and 23: UNCLASSIFIED ISAF has identified re
Page 24 and 25: UNCLASSIFIED 1.4: NATO-ISAF FORCE L
Page 26 and 27: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 2: EIAs Share b
Page 28 and 29: UNCLASSIFIED Ceasefires can have ne
Page 30 and 31: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 3: Nationwide S
Page 32 and 33: UNCLASSIFIED Belambai. The Panjwa
Page 34 and 35: UNCLASSIFIED security operations ha
Page 36 and 37: UNCLASSIFIED and become capable of
Page 38 and 39: UNCLASSIFIED to the province. GIRoA
Page 40 and 41: UNCLASSIFIED 1.8: INSIDER THREAT 8
Page 42 and 43: UNCLASSIFIED conduct an attack. Ins
Page 44 and 45: UNCLASSIFIED The numbers of attacks
Page 46 and 47: UNCLASSIFIED PPCs are responsible f
Page 48 and 49: UNCLASSIFIED formal procedure for m
Page 50 and 51: UNCLASSIFIED APRP funding provided
Page 52 and 53: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 9: Perceptions
Page 54 and 55: UNCLASSIFIED challenge for Afghans
Page 58 and 59: UNCLASSIFIED Renewed effort and att
Page 60 and 61: UNCLASSIFIED centralized “Soviet
Page 62 and 63: UNCLASSIFIED CM-1A CM-1B CM-2A CM-2
Page 64 and 65: UNCLASSIFIED Patang made significan
Page 66 and 67: UNCLASSIFIED Also of note this repo
Page 68 and 69: UNCLASSIFIED areas to continue the
Page 70 and 71: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 17: AAF End Str
Page 72 and 73: UNCLASSIFIED assigned outside of th
Page 74 and 75: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 20: ANASOF Oper
Page 76 and 77: UNCLASSIFIED ANASOF currently opera
Page 78 and 79: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 21: ANSF Enable
Page 80 and 81: UNCLASSIFIED Figure 22: ANA Logisti
Page 82 and 83: UNCLASSIFIED reaching the original
Page 84 and 85: UNCLASSIFIED Corruption and infiltr
Page 86 and 87: UNCLASSIFIED operations is the weak
Page 88 and 89: UNCLASSIFIED The International Poli
Page 90 and 91: UNCLASSIFIED smaller regional nodes
Page 92 and 93: UNCLASSIFIED The still-nascent ANP
Page 94 and 95: UNCLASSIFIED are the development of
Page 96 and 97: UNCLASSIFIED 2.8: AFGHAN PUBLIC PRO
Page 98 and 99: UNCLASSIFIED APPF Tasks and Mission
Page 100 and 101: UNCLASSIFIED APPF Support Criteria
Page 102 and 103: UNCLASSIFIED CM Definitions CM1 CM2
Page 104 and 105: UNCLASSIFIED governance and develop
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UNCLASSIFIED However, the shift fro
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UNCLASSIFIED Non-ALP Local Defense
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UNCLASSIFIED Continued ISAF support
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UNCLASSIFIED increasingly unsuitabl
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UNCLASSIFIED Both forces continued
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UNCLASSIFIED Category Metric How it
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UNCLASSIFIED At the NATO summit in
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UNCLASSIFIED Figure 33: ANSF Constr
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UNCLASSIFIED late in the planning p
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UNCLASSIFIED Despite the complex cu
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UNCLASSIFIED exchanging current pro
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UNCLASSIFIED In addition to the man
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UNCLASSIFIED prevent well-intention
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UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 3 - GOVERNANCE
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UNCLASSIFIED related tasks in suppo
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UNCLASSIFIED Within its mandate to
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UNCLASSIFIED to be exclusively run
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UNCLASSIFIED Customs revenues on cr
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UNCLASSIFIED 32 Presently NROLFSM-A
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UNCLASSIFIED The Afghan judicial sy
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UNCLASSIFIED However, there are are
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UNCLASSIFIED Since the first post-2
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UNCLASSIFIED review committee rejec
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UNCLASSIFIED the key points being t
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UNCLASSIFIED Enforcement Administra
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UNCLASSIFIED The CNP-A is the ANP c
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UNCLASSIFIED Afghanistan Threat Fin
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UNCLASSIFIED force; laying a founda
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UNCLASSIFIED pomegranates to 50 pro
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UNCLASSIFIED Continued USDA capacit
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UNCLASSIFIED Afghanistan’s effort
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UNCLASSIFIED Recent developments in
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UNCLASSIFIED For the East-West corr
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UNCLASSIFIED Additionally, DABS, ha
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UNCLASSIFIED Afghan Government. Cur
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UNCLASSIFIED million condoms and or
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UNCLASSIFIED The main U.S. Embassy
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UNCLASSIFIED GAs are full-time posi
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Percentage UNCLASSIFIED 60% Female
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UNCLASSIFIED India supports a varie
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UNCLASSIFIED this reporting period.
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UNCLASSIFIED major source of remitt
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UNCLASSIFIED A.1: MONTHLY SECURITY
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