Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
initial bi-lateral partnering arrangements and are now capable of leading operations that are
advised by ISAF. They provide a national response tackling the terrorist, insurgent and narcotic
threats that GIRoA faces. The 19 provincial response companies (PRCs), as the name indicates,
are provincially based Special Police units that specialize in civil order security and high-risk
arrests and partner with ISAF SOF for training and operations. The closer integration of
Intelligence & Surveillance Units (ISUs) with the PRCs is fundamental to the principles of
GDPSU and helps enable operations through an evidential based approach. In the reporting
period, the PRC have become more proficient in leading the planning, preparation, execution and
consequence management of their operations.
GDPSU has a consistently high operational tempo, but the response to the high-profile attack on
the Kabul Traffic Police HQ, PD3 Kabul on January 21, 2013, was notable; the incident was
resolved by CRU 222 with limited ISAF SOF enablement. Both Afghan and coalition afteraction
reviews revealed very few areas requiring further development. Appropriate C2, an
increased willingness for ANSF to work together and patience resulted in few deaths (three) and
positive media coverage, demonstrating a noticeable improvement in response capability over
the past 12 months.
Since the last report, the Special Police Foundation Course (SPFC) pilot began at the SPTC
November 3, 2012 – a milestone in terms of development, providing all provincial and national
units with a common starting point. The course graduated in February 2013, with 164 finishing
out of the 180 that started. As a result, 17 of the 19 PRCs will either reach or nearly reach FOC.
Advanced training for those selected continues at the National Mission Units (NMU), but will be
concentrated at the Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) by July 2013, once construction is
complete. The key unresolved issue for the SPTC remains provision of coordinated
administrative life support, with no NATO nation taking up this request.
Further development of the GDPSU is arguably constrained by the lack of incentive pay parity
across the force. GDPSU incentive payments have been introduced incrementally, and without
consistency, as the force has grown. As a result, incentive pay across GDPSU is not
commensurate with training, roles and missions. The potential for individual financial loss has
made special policemen reluctant to accept reassignment within GDPSU, thereby constraining
the commander’s ability to meet manning and force-development requirements, resulting in an
emerging capability gap. This capability gap is resultsfrom the commander’s inability to manage
his force efficiently. However, management of the significant number of pay incentives across
the ANSF is required to ensure GIRoA can achieve pay sustainably in the future. NTM-A has
‘frozen’ any adjustments to all currently paid incentives while they are reviewed.
The GDPSU is proactive in addressing many of the underlying leadership and organizational
issues, such as job stability and pay, but many solutions reside at MOI level. A lack of pay
parity with other security sector jobs (base salary and incentives pay) is still a problem, leading
to attrition levels far higher than desired. Some of this is based on inconsistency between those
different coalition partners funding the different parts of the ANSF's pay.
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