Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
until they are able to conduct operations independently. In some cases, SFA Teams (SFATs) are
supported by SFA Brigades (SFABs), which have replaced U.S. combat brigades as those
brigades redeploy. SFABs are redesigned maneuver units that manage risk, oversee force
protection and provide key support to SFATs when necessary. During the reporting period, six
U.S. combat brigades were drawn down and eight SFABs were deployed.
The SFAT model also reflects an evolution in how ISAF solicits partner nation troop
contributions, moving from a focus on geographic areas of responsibility to a model more
focused on ANSF unit sponsorship. Each SFAT is tailored to include individuals with specific
skills associated with the ANSF unit to which it is assigned. Each troop-contributing nation
determines its SFATs’ composition and disposition in order to meet ISAF requirements.
Currently, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has established
requirements for 460 SFATs; as of the end of the reporting period there is a shortfall of 60
SFATs. The near-term challenge for NATO is to enlist the support of troop-contributing nations
that have specific and readily usable and transferable skill sets for SFATs. SFAT requirements
will decrease through 2013 as the ANSF improves its ability to independently conduct
operations.
A Note on Metrics
ISAF has always used a comprehensive approach to assessing the campaign by considering a
wide array of metrics that address security, economic, governance and other trends. Public
reports such as this have, however, placed too much emphasis on enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs)
as a single measure of progress. As the nature of the conflict has evolved, it has become clear
that a tally of EIAs is not now, nor was it ever, the most complete measure of the campaign's
progress. At a time when more than 80 percent of EIAs are happening in areas where less than
20 percent of Afghans live—a result of ISAF’s and the ANSF’s success in driving the
insurgency out of populated areas—this single facet of the campaign has become significantly
less relevant in evaluating progress against the insurgency. Improvements in the capabilities of
the ANSF and progress in governance and development are far more indicative of success in
Afghanistan than the total number of EIAs. EIA trends, localized historical comparisons and a
large number of other metrics are still accurate and are used throughout this report. This report
will, however, no longer use nationwide EIA totals and historical comparisons of these totals as a
main metric of success in Afghanistan.
A key reason for this change in emphasis is that ISAF no longer has the ability to report most
EIAs. As it shifts from a combat mission and as the number of forces in theater rapidly declines,
ISAF is involved in a smaller share of tactical incidents that would be reported as compared with
a year ago. Instead, EIAs are now primarily an ANSF reporting responsibility. Although EIA
data are still a useable metric and comparisons with previous years are still valid under certain
circumstances, the previous depth of analysis and assessments is no longer as central to assessing
progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan.
In January 2013, ISAF discovered that a number of EIAs reported from independent ANSF
operations had not been included in its database. The ANSF had accurately reported these data,
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