Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
operations is the weakness of Afghanistan’s justice system. In many areas, links between the
ANP and the justice system are weak or nonexistent. Corruption and police abuse of civilians
remain problems in much of the country.
As part of the transition of the ANP from a COIN force to one more focused on traditional police
activities, the MoI decided to disband its ANP zone headquarters in March 2013. Disbanding
will create an ANP command structure that is less reflective of the ANA structure but is more in
line with the structure of most non-wartime police forces. The full implementation and
consequences of this decision had yet to occur as of the end of the reporting period.
The ABP and ANCOP continue to be used to support traditional COIN efforts as well as to
enable or support ANA operations. Although the ABP continues its COIN mission, the force is
making an effort to shift more of its focus towards the traditional border mission, including
training, equipping and professionalizing the force at the major border control points (BCPs) and
airports of entry.
Unfortunately, insurgent attacks, continued corruption and limited literacy across the force
continue to undermine positive police recruiting, training and professionalization goals as the
ANP is generated and fielded. The January 2013 attack against the Traffic Police Headquarters
in downtown Kabul is an example of the insurgent attacks that are increasingly targeting the
ANP.
Another challenge facing the ANP is command and control. The ANP Command and Control
structure is overly complex. Communications between Kabul and the provincial and district
police departments is minimal. Furthermore, the MoI has little authority over the Provincial
Chiefs of Police (PCOPs) and District Chiefs of Police (DCOPs), and the authority the MoI does
possess is impacted by political interference. In the future, this problem may be exacerbated by
the recent decision to disband the police zones system. Finally, the lack of a dedicated civil
service component often results in police officers being pulled from patrol duty in order to
perform administrative actions.
These issues are exacerbated by the ANP’s continuing problems in the area of communications.
Difficult terrain, the inability of the ANP to repair inoperable radios and unreliable radio
communications all contribute to this problem. Many AUP and ABP units continue to rely on
cell phone communications as their primary means for communicating to Operational
Coordination Centers (OCCs) and higher police HQs. Cell phone usage is also an issue in areas
where power is inconsistent and cell towers do not function for several hours during the day.
Corruption and the impact of local power brokers on the ANP vary by unit. The further ANP
units are positioned from government centers, such as Kabul or provincial centers, the more
likely the units are to feel the influence of tribal or traditional power brokers. Rural-based ANP
units are also much more likely to succumb to Taliban and criminal patronage network influence.
This influence may materialize in the form of non-aggression pacts, bribery or collusion with
criminal networks. Endemic corruption and local power broker interference can lead to violence,
as was seen with former Baghlan-e Jadid District Chief of Police LTC Kamin and former District
Civil Order Police Chief Amir Gul in fall of 2012. Both men were complicit in extortion of local
79