Report - United States Department of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
Although charged with serving as the government’s highest coordinating body for the
implementation of administrative procedural reform, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-
Corruption (HOOAC) remains a weak institution with few to no enforcement mechanisms.
Despite persistent ISAF and U.S. Embassy engagement, the Presidential Executive Committee
(PEC) on Borders, Airports and Customs Depots has yet to be fully actualized. This deficiency
leaves Afghanistan with no inter-ministerial process to address significant security and economic
challenges through a whole-of-government approach. Additionally, significant concerns
regarding inadequate prosecution of interdicted narcotics and lethal contraband persist, resulting
in continued security and economic challenges. The APPF still faces a number of potential longterm
corruption and capacity issues; these could contribute to an economy driven by a few ultrarich
elite and further constrain humanitarian efforts as ISAF forces redeploy.
There appears to have been a modest increase in political will to tackle corruption by some
senior Afghan leaders. Within the MoD and MoI, there are signs of growing political will
among several key senior leaders, as evidenced by the Minister of Interior’s actions to remove
corrupt police officers and establish “Shafafiyat Commissions” in zones and provinces, and by
the MoD’s progress on the ONSC TAWG action plan.
PD 45 levied anti-/counter-corruption mandates on several Afghan ministries, including the
AGO and HOOAC. Unfortunately, many of the decree’s articles ordered ministries to perform
actions already required by law or regulation. The decree also imposed aggressive timelines for
completion of these tasks. There is an articulated general ministerial desire to meet the PD 45
mandates but there has been little progress to date. Much of the progress that has been made
towards meeting PD 45’s requirements has been in the form of updates given to Parliament.
None of these reports has been supported by solid evidence of progress.
Interagency Counter-Corruption Efforts
To achieve greater unity of effort through enhanced synchronization, ISAF executed a
realignment of the Civil-Military Counter Threat Network (Integrated Counter-Narcotics,
Counter-Transnational Organized Crime, Counter-Threat Finance, and Counter-Terrorism
Nexus) command and control (C2) construct. Counter Threat Network (CTN) commands
(CJIATF-Shafafiyat, CJIATF-Nexus, Task Force 2010, assisted by the Interagency Operations
Coordination Center and the Afghan Threat Finance Cell) are now nested under the newly
established CJIATF-A. The synergy that will be achieved by better coordinating the execution
of all CTN operations will increase the opportunity to meet the desired effects in Theater. This
new construct will organize and conduct integrated Joint and Interagency Counter-Corruption
operations to support ISAF strategic-effects targeting.
In October 2012, CJIATF-Shafafiyat led the Counter Corruption and Organized Crime
Interagency Effects Group (CCIEG) outbrief to COMISAF. The purpose of the review was to
develop a common understanding among ISAF and international community partners of the level
of corruption within the justice sector, with nine substantive areas being examined in detail in
conjunction with Afghan justice sector subject matter experts. CJIATF Shafafiyat presented
recommendations and courses of action in an attempt to diminish the impact of corruption, with
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